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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters.
The first chapter examines the frequency of banking crisis is statistically
significantly correlated to growth for the time windows of 1 decade and 2 decades, this
negative relationship becoming increasingly more statistically insignificant overall for time
windows from 3 decades to 10 decades before finally becoming positive, though
statistically insignificant, for the time windows of 13 decades and longer for our sample.
The frequency of currency crisis is statistically significantly negatively associated with
growth overall for the time windows of 1 decade to 10 decades, before becoming
insignificantly positive for time windows of 13 decades and longer for our sample.
The second chapter examines the effect of capital account openness on growth
using two measurements of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL (1955-2004) and The
Chinn-Ito Index (1970-2014). I find that capital account openness had a positive effect on
5-year average growth, 10-year average growth and 20-year average growth based on panel
analyses, but an insignificant even negative effect on growth in the long run based on crosssectional regressions. The results are robust to controlling country dummy and time
dummy.
The third chapter uses data of Gini coefficient, GDP per capita, ratio of fixed capital
to GDP and ratio of labor to GDP from China for period 1978-2013, this paper attempts to
explore long run and short run causality relationship between income inequality and
growth. My findings show there exist neither long run nor short run causality link between
Gini coefficient and log of GDP per capita.
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CHAPTER ONE
Banking Crisis, Currency Crisis and Growth
This paper examines the effect of banking and currency crises on long-run growth.
Our data cover 130 economies from 1800 to 2010, some dating from 1800 with the rest
beginning in later years. The data include banking crises, currency crises, output per
worker, growth rate of population and regional dummies.
We found that both the frequency of banking crises and the frequency of currency
crises have a negative and statistically significant effect on growth in the short run and a
positive effect on growth, though statistically insignificant, in the longer run. While the
frequency of currency crisis has a more negative impact on growth in the short to medium
run (10 decades) than does the frequency of banking crisis, the effects of both become
insignificantly positive in the longer run.
More specifically, we show that the frequency of banking crisis is statistically
significantly correlated to growth for the time windows of 1 decade and 2 decades, this
negative relationship becoming increasingly more statistically insignificant overall for time
windows from 3 decades to 10 decades before finally becoming positive, though
statistically insignificant, for the time windows of 13 decades and longer for our sample.
The frequency of currency crisis is statistically significantly negatively associated with
growth overall for the time windows of 1 decade to 10 decades, before becoming
insignificantly positive for time windows of 13 decades and longer for our sample.
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1. Introduction
Financial crisis, which has attracted people’s attention since the Great Depression,
is one of the dominant economic features of our age, with one of the resulting questions
becoming: How does financial crisis affect economic growth? This paper limits financial
crisis to banking crisis and currency crisis only. To answer this question, we attempt to
explore further the relationship between banking crises, currency crises and growth from
short-run to long-run based on the existing literature.
The first and perhaps the deepest impression about a financial crisis is its strong
destructive power and contagious effect. Indeed, a large body of literature discusses the
output loss caused by banking and currency crises, most exploring recessions and their
subsequent recoveries after banking and currency crises, showing how disruptive these
financial crises are and how long it takes for economies to recover. For example, Bordo et
al. (2001) concluded that banking and currency crises were more frequent but less costly
in the 1980s and 1990s based on data for 23 countries from the nineteenth century until
today, and Claessens et al. (2012) show that recessions accompanied with episodes of
financial disruption, notably house and equity price busts, tend to be longer and deeper,
while recoveries combined with rapid growth in credit and house prices tend to be stronger.
Bordo and Haubrich (2012) examine the strength of recoveries after banking crises,
finding that deeper recessions associated with them are also associated with faster
recoveries. Similar results were found by Dwyer et al. (2013), who concluded that crosscountry evidence is consistent with Zarnowitz’s Law, i.e., if there is a contraction in
economic activity as measured by real GDP per capita after a banking crisis, a larger fall
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is associated with recovery at a faster rate; however, they also found a substantial diversity
in the effect of banking crises on real GDP per capita.
More recently, Devereux and Dwyer (2016) examined the output costs associated
with 150 banking crises using cross-country data after 1970, finding many banking crises
do not lead to contractions and most do not lead to large contractions, a result that holds
for both developed and developing economies. In addition, they found that output losses
are positively related to prior economic conditions such as credit growth for developed
economies. For low-income economies, they found that other factors such as having a stock
market and deposit insurance are more important.
Another stream of the literature addresses the relationship between banking crisis,
currency crisis and growth, an area closer to the question posed earlier, with Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (2000) finding that growth tends to decline in the year when the crisis occurred
and to recover thereafter; in addition, countries more open to trade tend to grow faster after
currency crises. Barro (2001) conducted a panel analysis of 67 industrialized and emerging
countries, finding that a twin crisis typically reduces economic growth over a five-year
period by 2% per year. In addition, he found that the financial crises had no persistent
effects on growth beyond a five-year period. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), who examined
the fifteen worst financial crises of the second half of 20th century, found that 10 years
after these crises, the median level of GDP per capita was still 15 percent below the trend
level prior to crisis, although GDP was unaffected once enough time passed.
Hong and Tornell (2005) investigated data from 100 developing countries, finding
that even if the growth rate of GDP recovered to its pre-trend level two to three years after
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a recession resulting from a currency crisis, it falls permanently below the original growth
path that it would have achieved without the crisis. Gupta et al.’s (2007) study of 195
episodes of currency crises in developing countries from 1970 to 2000 found that
approximately 60% of them were accompanied by output contraction, while the rest were
accompanied by output expansion. They concluded that crises are 1.5 times more likely to
be contractionary in emerging markets than in developing economies. Cecchetti et al. (2009)
used 40 systemic crises with information on the policies implemented found in Laeven and
Valencia (2008), complementing the data for these 40 crises with more detailed
information on initial conditions and outcomes. They found most systemic banking crises
led to a decrease in growth, taking the economies several years to recover to their prior
peak level. Bordo et al. (2010) investigated the impact of foreign currency debt on currency
and debt crises and their indirect effects on short-term growth and long-term output based
on data from 45 countries from 1880-1913 and 1973-2003, finding that the financial crisis
driven by foreign currency exposure led to significant permanent output losses, and
Reinhart and Rogoff (2015) investigated 66 countries over an extensive period, finding that
crises are typically associated with lower medium-term (five to ten years) growth.
This research introduced above provides evidence for a negative impact of banking
and currency crises on economic growth. Based on their earlier work (Rancière et al, 2006),
Rancière et al. (2008), found results contradicting these studies that long-run growth (from
10 to 40 years) and banking crises are positively related. They showed that over the last
four decades, countries that have experienced financial crises have, on average, grown
faster than countries with stable financial conditions. To explain this finding, they present
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a model in which contract enforceability problems generate borrowing constraints and
impede growth. The key of to this mechanism is that government bailout guarantees
encouraged individuals to take more risks than would otherwise be the case, and this
behavior increases investment rate, further enhancing growth although this strategy incurs
systemic crisis occasionally, a well-known moral hazard combined with institutional
factors and policies at work. Similarly, Houston et al. (2010) also found a higher likelihood
of financial crisis could be associated positively with higher growth by initiating stronger
creditor rights to encourage both risk-taking and enhanced growth. Jarrow (2014) proposed
a model to explain this bilateral relationship between financial development and economic
growth.
Contrasting findings give us different perspectives, the overall reasoning being that
if the prosperity of the financial industry inherently contributes to economic growth, there
must exist some underlying risk factors accompanying the development of this industry. A
financial crisis will break out at some point when that these risks evolve out of control.
Therefore, the development of financial markets is a two-edged sword. In this sense, the
negative short-run correlation between financial crisis and growth may be positive or
negligible in the long run.
Consider an extreme case such as North Korea, which has a repressed financial
system run by the government. There is no possibility of a financial crisis in North Korea
even if the country experiences a lack of economic growth. Beyond that extreme, though,
the countries with stable financial conditions (a safe path) might not grow faster than the
countries with risk-taking tendencies (a risky path).
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There is another possible role that financial crisis plays, that is, reform catalyst.
Government, institutions and even the public can learn lessons from financial crisis, this
will increase institutional quality, which is beneficial to growth in the long run.
If a country can learn from the financial crisis and subsequently takes institutional
reform, then this country will possibly get stronger and make financial crisis less costly. In
turn, this makes it utilize the positive effect of financial system on growth to the utmost
extent, and then financial crisis might actually regenerate a vibrant economy. The literature
introduced above, which is not extensive, finds mixed results on the effect of crises on an
economic growth in the long run. Theoretically, either relationship is possible. Then it is
just the mixed evidence in the literature trigger us to examine the relationship between
banking, currency crises and long-term growth.
Based on the existing literature, we construct a broader dataset covering 130
countries from 1800 to 2010, a period much longer than that found in most of the literature.
Our data on banking crises and currency crises combine 4 sources, i.e., Bordo et al. (2001),
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia (2013), and our data of the output
per worker and population growth come from Tamura et al. (2016).
Some countries in our consolidated dataset cover the entire period from 1800 to
2010, with the remainder encompassing later time spans as explained in detail in Section
Two. As our results show, the frequency of banking crises is significantly negatively
associated with growth for time windows of one and 2 decades, a negative relationship that
becomes increasingly more insignificant overall for time windows from three to 10 decades,
and finally becoming a positive though insignificant for longer time window of 13, 16, and
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19 decades. While the frequency of a currency crisis is significantly negatively associated
with growth overall for time windows from one to 10 decades, it becomes insignificantly
positive for time windows of 13, 16, and 19 decades. In the short to medium run, the
frequency of currency crisis is more negatively related to growth than the frequency of
banking crisis. These results are more comprehensive than those found in previous works,
for they incorporate short-term, medium-term and long-term analyses, thereby actually
capturing the evolution of the relationship between banking crises, currency crises and
economic growth.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the definitions of banking
crisis and currency crisis, providing an historical review of the theories associated with
them. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis, and Sections 4 offers conclusions and
implications of this work.

2. Definitions and Duration of Banking Crises and Currency Crises
2.1. Definitions of Banking Crisis
The fact that definitions and dating of banking crises differ across studies has been
discussed in previous work before (see Frydl, 1999; Boyd et al. 2009; Babecký et al., 2012).
Table 1.1 gives the definitions for dating the various types of crises for the three sources
of our dataset: Bordo et al. (BEKM); Laeven and Valencia (LV); Reinhart and Rogoff (RR).
As this table shows, these vary across these three datasets. In particular, for banking crises,
researchers disagree about how many banks must be closed or what percentage of the
financial system’s capital must be impaired for a crisis to be classified as systemic.

7

Table 1.1. Definitions of Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis
Authors

Sample

Banking Crisis Definition

Currency Crisis Definition

Bordo et

1880-1939

Financial distress resulting in the erosion

Forced change in parity, abandonment of a

al(2001)

21 Advanced

of most or all of aggregate banking system

pegged exchange rate, or an international

Countries

capital as in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996)

rescue.

1945-1997

OR: an exchange market pressure (EMP)

21 Advanced

above a critical threshold (calculated as a

Countries +

weighted average of exchange rate change,

34 Less

short-term interest rate change, and reserve

Developed

change relative to the same for the center

Countries and

country, the UK before 1913 and the US after).

Emerging Market

A currency crisis is said to occur when this

Economies

index exceeds a critical threshold. We score an
episode as a currency crisis when it shows up
according to either or both of these indicators

Reinhart

1800-2011

A banking crisis occurs when there are one

Reinhart and Rogoff(2009) An annual

and Rogoff

70 Countries

of two types of events:

depreciation versus the US dollar (or the

(1) bank runs that lead to the closure,

relevant reserve currency currency—

merging, or takeover by the public sector

historically the UK pound, the French franc, or

of one or more financial institutions;

the German DM and presently the euro) of 15

OR

percent or more.

(2009)

(2) if there are no runs, the closure,
merging, takeover, or large-scale
government assistance of an important
financial institution (or group of
institutions), that marks the start of a string
of similar outcomes for other financial
institutions.
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Laeven

1970-2011

Two conditions

Nominal depreciation of the currency against

and

162 Countries

1.

the dollar of at least 30% that is also 10

Valencia

Significant signs of financial distress in

percentage points higher than the rate of

(2012)

the banking system (as indicated by

depreciation in the year before.

significant bank runs, losses in the banking
system, and/or bank liquidations)
2. Significant banking policy intervention
measures in response to significant losses
in the banking system.

The dating of banking crises has traditionally relied primarily on the identification
of “events” or subjective criteria to determine when one occurs (for example, Caprio and
Klingebiel, 1996; Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera, 2005; and Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2009). While the advantage of such an approach is its flexiblility, the disadvantage
is that it may be seen as arbitrary. The definition of banking crisis provided by Laeven and
Valencia (2013) is more clear and easy to quantify, hence, less subject to such criticism.
To compare the accuracy of various databases of banking crises, Chaudron et al.
(2014) have compiled data to reconstruct the most important aspects of a systemic banking
crisis based on their definition that a significant number or proportion of the banks must
fail and/or that a significant proportion of the banking’s sector equity must have faced
losses. Using these data, Chaudron et al. (2014) compared the dating of banking crises for
the three leading databases (Caprio et al, 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Laeven and
Valencia, 2013) for the four crises with the most different time periods across these
databases– the United States savings and loan crisis during the 1980s, the Japanese banking
crisis of the 1990s, Norway’s banking crisis during the early 1990s and Turkey’s crisis
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around the turn of the century. Their evidence suggests the database of banking crises
compiled by Laeven and Valencia is the most accurate. The standard adopted by Charudron
et al. (2014) does not take into account the possible interventions of the government that
could reduce bank failures while both RR’s and LV’s definitions of a banking crisis
consider large-scale of government intervention, meaning the latter would consider an
event not accompanied with substantial capital loss due to the intervention by government
as a banking crisis while Charudron et al.(2014) would not.
Unsatisfied with the prevalent definitions of banking crisis, Von Hagen and Ho
(2007) propose an index based on money market pressure to identify banking crises for 47
countries from 1980 to 2001. They measure the money market pressure by the change in
the short-term interest rate divided by its standard deviation plus the change in the volume
of central bank reserves divided by its standard deviation. Based on Von Hagen and Ho
(2007), Jing, Zhongbo, et al (2015) modify the market pressure index and identify banking
crises for 109 countries from 1970 to 2009. Boyd et al. (2009) developed systemic bank
shock indicators based on a theoretical model.

2.2. Definitions of Currency Crisis
Currency crisis is a situation in which a country with a fixed or pegged exchange
rate faces a financial situation such as a deterioration of economic fundamentals or a
speculative attack on the foreign exchange market, resulting in it needing to move to a
floating exchange rate regime. Since the exchange rate determined by market is much
higher than pegged level, the central bank of the country does not have sufficient foreign
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exchange reserves to maintain the pegged fixed exchange rate, subsequently leading to a
chronic balance of payments deficit and finally, the currency depreciating dramatically.
This currency crisis is also referred to as a balance of payments crisis.
The definitions of currency crisis are not as different as the definitions of banking
crisis, for it is much easier to quantify by the change in the exchange rate. A currency crisis
is usually identified by a threshold decline (e.g., 15% or 30%) in the nominal exchange
rate. Both Laeven and Valencia (2013) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) adopt the definition
proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996).

2.3. History and theory overview of banking crises
Banking crises have been around for a long history, were referred to as bank panics
or liquidity crises before the appearance of deposit insurance or other forms of government
guarantees and the creation of the lender of last resort (see Bordo et al., 2016). During a
bank panic many depositors rush to convert their deposits into cash almost simultaneously,
leading to bank failure since these institutions do not have enough reserves to meet the
demand. Bank panics were typical in the nineteenth century for the developed countries
where the central bank functioned as the lender of last resort. After WWII, with the
widespread adoption of deposit insurance and the intervention by the lender of last resort,
banking panics become rare. Instead, now banking issues largely involve the insolvency
of significant parts of the banking system, referred to as banking crises.
According to Bordo et al. (2016), there are three traditional approaches for
theorizing about banking crises: the monetarist approach; the financial fragility approach
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and the business cycles approach, with the contemporary literature based on rational
expectations and game theory being based on these. The first approach, the monetarist
approach developed by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), identifies financial crises with
banking panics. According to them, banking panics occur because the public loses
confidence in the ability of banks to convert deposits into currency. This loss of confidence
is typically associated with the failure of important financial institutions as happened in
1873, 1893, and 1907.
The business cycles approach views banking panics as more likely during a
recession because the returns on bank assets are likely to fall as borrowers become less
likely to repay their loans (Mitchell, 1941). Depositors anticipating an increase in nonperforming loans try to protect their wealth by withdrawing their deposits, precipitating a
bank run (Allen and Gale, 2007).
Government guarantees created a direct link between the banking system and the
government’s balance sheet. Once this precedent was set, a costly bailout had the potential
to create significant fiscal imbalance and even lead to default. Moreover, guarantees could
also lead to moral hazard problems.
The third approach, the financial fragility approach, regards financial crises as an
essential part of the upper turning point of the business cycle and as a necessary
consequence of the excesses of the previous boom. Its well-known twentieth century
proponents are Hyman Minsky (1977) and Henry Kaufman (1986). This approach has seen
increased interest since the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
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2.4. History and theory overview of currency crises
Advanced countries under the pre-1914 gold standard generally avoided currency
crises, speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate reflecting an inconsistency between
domestic fundamentals and the peg; however, they became a larger concern in the interwar
and under the Bretton Woods system (Bordo et. al., 2001). Many currency crises, for
example those in the early 1970s during the breakdown of the Bretton Woods global system,
were due to the conflict between the goal of maintaining a fixed exchange-rate regime with
other policy goals.
In the first-generation model of currency crises, Krugman (1979) argued that the
conflict of domestic fiscal and monetary fundamentals with the pegging exchange rate
would incur speculative attacks. The second-generation models (Obstfeld, 1995) suggest
that self-fulfilling prophecies potentially occur: if investors expect other investors to attack
the currency, then they attack the currency rationally. The Asian crisis led to the creation
of third- generation speculative attack models. Both the financial institutions and the
exchange-rate regimes collapsed in this crisis, indicating the links between governments
and financial institutions can expose the system to further fragility. The third-generation
models explore how problems in the banking and financial system interact with currency
crises and how these crises impact the rest of the economy (McKinnon & Pill (1996),
Krugman (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, & Roubini (1998), Radelet & Sachs (1998), Chang and
Velasco (2000), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001 and 2004), Krugman(1999)).

2.5. Relationship between banking crisis and currency crisis
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According to Bordo and Meissner (2015), during the post-World War II period and
especially since the 1970s, banking, currency, and debt crises have become closely linked
because governments realized the disastrous consequence of banking panics, becoming
more willing to guarantee significant percentages of the liabilities of the banking system;
because of this decision, banking panics have evolved into sovereign debt crises.
Frequently, currency crises have occurred simultaneously with banking crises, a situation
referred to as twin crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Glick and Hutchison (2000)
found that these twin crises occurred frequently in financially liberalized emerging markets,
with banking crisis frequently preceding the currency crisis in emerging markets but the
converse not holding true.
Causality between these two can begin with either the crisis: a banking crisis can
lead to capital flight and consequently currency devaluation, while a currency crisis can,
in turn, lead to insolvency for banks holding a large number of foreign currency
denominated liabilities and domestic currency denominated assets. In addition, there may
be joint causality, i. e., some underlying common factors that cause the twin crisis, meaning
there might not be a causality relationship between banking and currency crises (see Chang
and Velasco (1999), McKinnon and Pill (1996, 1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) ).

2.6. Duration of banking crises and currency crises
While the researchers listed in Table 1.1 define duration as the time it takes for an
economy to recover from the downturn after financial crises, they differ in the standards
used to measure the recovery. Even though it is more accurately phrases as “duration of
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recession after crisis,” for simplicity, we will refer to it as the “duration of crisis.” Below
are the definitions for duration of crisis for these three researchers:
•

According to Bordo et al. (2001, p. 55), “To quantify the depth and duration of
crises, we calculate the trend rate of growth of GDP for five years preceding the
event. Recovery time, that is, crisis duration, is calculated as the number of years
before GDP growth returns to the trend.”

•

According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2014, pp. 51) “duration measure is the number
of years it takes to reach the prior peak in real per capita income.”

•

And Leaven and Valencia (2013, pp. 245) define it as “the end of a crisis as the
year before both real GDP growth and real credit growth are positive for at least
two consecutive years. In case the first two years record growth in real GDP and
real credit, the crisis end date equals the starting date of the crisis. In computing
end dates, we use bank credit to the private sector (in national currency) from IFS
(line 22d). . . . We truncate the duration of crises at five years, starting with the
first crisis year. . . We also report the duration of the crisis, computed as the
difference between the end and start years of the crisis, measured in years.”
As all three definitions of the duration of a crisis is measured in years, for this

research, the minimum duration of a crisis is required to be at least one year. The duration
of all banking crises and currency crises in our sample are shown in detail in Table A1 in
Appendix.

3. Data description
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We use three data sources from the banking crises and currency crises listed in
Table 1.1, i.e., from Bordo et al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and
Valencia (2013), and one source of output per worker and growth rate of population from
Tamura et al. (2016). We combined these datasets of financial crisis following the
procedure of Dwyer et al. (2013), using the dataset from Bordo et al.(2001) before 1970
and Laeven and Valencia (2013) for 1970 on, and then Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) when
these two datasets are not available. More specifically, Bordo et al. (2001) provide data
for a 21-country sample from 1880 to1939 and 21 advanced countries plus 34 less
developed countries and emerging markets. The crises dataset from Laeven and Valencia
(2013) covers 161 countries from 1970 to 2011 during which they identify 147 banking
crises. The variables we used are listed in Table 1.2.
The communistic countries during this time period adopted a planned economy
regime, which did not have a banking system nor did it experience financial crises. In
addition, these countries adopted a Material Product Balance System (MPS), while
capitalist countries adopted the System of National Accounts (NAS), the former is based
on a planned economy while the latter is based on a market economy. Most of the
communist countries switched to market-oriented countries after the dissolution of Soviet
Union in 1991. While the data of the countries ever adopted communist regime are poorly
estimated even decades after their transition. Given these differences, the data are not
comparable between these two economies for our sample. In addition, our dataset is divided
into 1 decade, 2 decades, …, 10 decades, while there are only 2 decades from 1990s to
2010, which is not long enough to cover the length of time windows longer than 3 decades.
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Henceforth we just delete the data of the countries ever adopted communist regime.
As a result, we deleted the data from the countries under a communist regime,
meaning our combined dataset included 130 countries from 1800 to 2010. The initial years
in our sample differ across countries, focusing on 1800, 1820 and 1970 with all end dates
being the year 2010. Figure 1.1 shows the beginning years of the different countries in the
sample.
Figure 1.1 shows the beginning years of different countries in the sample.
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Figure 1.1 Beginning Years of Different Countries

Figure 1.2 shows the number of countries in the each beginning year for our sample.
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Table 1.2. Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in the Regression Analysis
Variable

Definition and construction

Source

Output per Worker

Output per worker in 2000 constant US$

Tamura et al.(2016)

Log difference of Output per worker

Tamura et al.(2016)

Log difference of Population

Tamura et al.(2016)

Frequency of Banking

The number of banking crises a country

Bordo et al.(2001), Reinhart and Rogoff

Crises

experienced during a given period

(2011), Laeven and Valencia (2013)

Frequency of

The number of currency crises a country

Bordo et al.(2001), Reinhart and Rogoff

Currency Crises

experienced during a given period

(2011), Laeven and Valencia (2013)

Growth Rate of
Output per Worker
Growth Rate of
Population

Western Countries: 1
Southern Europe: 2
Tamura et al.(2016)

Region Dummy
Central and Eastern Europe: 3
Newly Industrialized Countries: 4
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Asia: 5
Sub-Saharan Africa: 6
Latin America: 7
Middle East: 8
North Africa: 9

It should be noted that as will be shown in Section 3, the dataset is divided into
decadal intervals, which are of multiple decades, the value in end years of each decade,
1800, 1810, …, 2010 are used for calculating the average annual growth rate of output per
worker and population , while the frequency of data provided by Tamura et al. (2016) is
only approximately but not exactly decadal. The missing data from Tamura et al. (2016)
in the end years of each decade 1800, 1810, 1820, 1830... 2000 and 2010 were interpolated.
After comparing various methods, we chose the geometrically interpolation method in
which the values for the missing years are interpolated by adjacent available values. One
limitation of this method is that the value in the interpolated year may be substantially
different from the surrounding values for such reasons as financial crises, political crises
or natural disasters. This issue, however, will be addressed in the long-run analysis.
The regional dummy variable comes from Tamura et al. (2016), who followed the
convention of Lucas (1988) in region composition, with the only exceptions being the
placement of Israel and Turkey in the Southern Europe region.
Table 1.3. Summary Statistics 1
Statistics

Formula
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Value

%

𝑇𝐵 =

Total Number of Banking Crises

𝑇𝐵$

248

𝑇𝐶$

458

𝑇𝐵$
𝑁
𝑇$

0.0153

𝑇𝐶$
𝑁
𝑇$

0.0284

$&'
%

𝑇𝐵 =

Total Number of Currency Crises

$&'
%

Average Number of Banking Crises per Country per Year

𝐴𝐵 =
$&'
%

Average Number of Currency Crises per Country per Year

𝐴𝐶 =
$&'

%

Average Annual Growth Rate of Output Per Worker

𝐴𝐺_𝑌 =
$&'
%

𝐴𝐺_𝑃 =

Average Annual Growth Rate of Population

$&'

𝐺_𝑌$
𝑁
𝑇$

0.0136

𝐺_𝑃$
𝑁
𝑇$

0.0168

Note: 𝑇𝐵$ , Total number of banking crises for country 𝑖 over its sample period.
	
  𝑇𝐵, Total number of banking crises over our sample.
𝑇𝐶$ , Total number of currency crises for country 𝑖 over its sample period.
	
  𝑇𝐶, Total number of currency crises over our sample.
𝐴𝐺_𝑌, Average annual growth rate of output per worker over our sample.
𝐴𝐺_𝑃, Average annual growth rate of output per worker over our sample.
	
  𝐺 _𝑌$ , Average annual growth rate of output per worker for country 𝑖 over its sample period.
𝐺_𝑃$ , Average annual growth rate of population for country 𝑖 over its sample period.
𝑇$ , The length of sample period of country 𝑖.

Table 1.3 shows that the total number of banking crises is 248 and the total number
of currency crises is 458 in our sample, the average number of banking crises per country
per year is 0.015, and the average number of banking crises per country per year is 0.028.
These two average values could be taken as the probability of the occurrence of banking
crisis or currency crisis for a country in any given year for our sample. Moreover, average
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annual growth rate of output per worker over our sample is 0.014 and average annual
growth rate of population over our sample is 0.017.

Table 1.4. Summary Statistics 2
Statistics

Mean

Median

Min

Max

Std Deviation

Duration of Banking Crises

2.3

1

1

11

1.7

Duration of Currency Crises

1.2

1

1

8

0.6

Duration between Banking Crises

26.7

13.5

2

152

28.8

Duration between Currency Crises

13.4

9

2

100

14.4

Based on the definitions of duration of banking crisis and currency crisis introduced
in sub-section 2.6, Table 1.4 shows the summary statistics of the duration of banking crises,
the duration of currency crises, the duration between banking crises and the duration
between currency crises, shown in Figure 1.3, Figure 1.4, Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6,
respectively.
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Figure 1.3. Histogram of the Duration of Banking Crises

More specifically, Figure 1.3 shows the histogram of the duration banking crises in
our sample. We can see the minimum duration of a banking crisis is one year, as defined
in Section 2.7, while the longest banking crisis lasts 11 years; the average duration of a
banking crisis is 2.3 years, the median of which is 1 year, meaning that more than half of
the banking crises last no more than 1 year. Of the 248 banking crises total in our sample,
128 last for 1 year, 29 for 2 years, 36 for 3 years, 20 for four years and 31 for 5 years.
Figure 1.4 below shows the histogram of currency banking crises in our sample.
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Figure 1.4. Histogram of the Duration of Currency Crises

We can see the minimum duration of currency crises is 1 year as defined in Section
2.7, with the longest currency crisis lasting 6 years; the average duration of the currency
crises is 1.2 years, with a median of 1 year, meaning that more than half of currency crises
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last no more than 1 year. Of the 458 total currency crises in our sample, 391 last for 1
year, 47 for 2 years, 14 for 3 years, 2 for 4 years, 1 for 5 years, and 3 for 6 years.
Figure 1.5 below shows the histogram of duration between banking crises in our
sample.
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Figure 1.5. Histogram of Duration Between Banking Crises

We can see from this histogram that the shortest duration between banking crises
is only 2 years, while the longest is 152 years, meaning that for 152 years, no banking crisis
as defined in Section 2 occurred. The average duration between banking crises is 26.7 years,
with a median of 13.5 years.
Figure 1.6 below shows the histogram between currency crises in our sample.
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Figure 1.6. Histogram of Duration Between Currency Crises

We can see from this histogram that the shortest duration between currency crises
is only 2 years, while the longest duration lasts 100 years, meaning that for a period of 100
years, no currency crisis as defined in Section 2 occurred. The average duration between
currency crises is 13.4 years, with a median of 9 years.
Figure 1.7 below shows the number and percentage of countries experiencing
banking and currency crisis from 1800 to 2010.
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PANEL A

PANEL B

Figure 1.7. Number and Percentage of Countries Experiencing Banking and Currency Crisis from 1800 to 2010

This figure consists of two panels. Panel A shows the number of countries in
financial crisis from 1800 to 2010, with the blue line representing the number experiencing
a banking crisis during that period and the orange line, the number experiencing a currency
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crisis. Similar to the curve in figure 1.2, the green curve represents the total number of
countries included in our sample from 1800 to 2010.
Panel B shows the percentage of countries experiencing crises from 1800 to 2010,
with the red line representing the percentage experiencing banking crises during that period
and the green line the percentage experiencing a currency crisis. We can see clearly from
PANEL B that, banking crises occurred highly simultaneously with currency crises. The
percentage of countries experiencing currency crisis peaks significantly in 1815 at 0.35,
1914 at 0.27, 1931 at 0.34 and 1949 at 0.24. Overall, the percentage of countries
experiencing banking crisis is lower than that of countries experiencing currency crisis
from during 1800-2010 period, with only one peak exceeds 0.20 in 1931, and three peaks
exceeds 0.15 in 1814, 1915, and 1993-1995.
Figure 1.8 shows the log of output per worker from 1800 to 2010.
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Figure 1.8. Log of Output per Worker for the Initial Years of Each Decade from 1800 to 2010

This figure clearly shows that the output per worker grew slowly but steadily during
this period. The range of the log of output per worker increases over the years, with some
being scattered far from the majority beginning in 1950. Part of the reason for this trend
is that the number of countries increases from 66 in 1950 to 121 in 1950 as is shown in
Figure 1.1. While most of the countries included after 1950 are low and middle-income
countries, some of these economies expanded after 1950, and the gap between rich
countries and poor countries became increasingly larger.
Figure 1.9 depicts the average growth rate of population of the countries for each
decade from 1800 to 2010.
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Figure 1.9. Average Growth Rate of Population of Countries from 1800 to 2010

As this figure shows, the growth rate of population remains very stable from 1800
to 2010, and most of the countries in our sample have an average growth rate of population
of 0 to 0.05. The positive outlier in decade of 1851-1860 is in New Zealand, which has
average annual growth rate of population of 12.91% during the decade. And the especially
low outlier in decade of 1911-1920 is in Austria, which has average annual growth rate of
population of -11.46% during the decade.
Figure 1.10 incorporates three parts into one graph, i.e., growth rate of output per
worker per country for each decade, average number of banking crises and currency crises
per country for each decade from 1800 to 2010.

28

Figure 1.10. Growth Rate of Output per Worker per Country for Each Decade, Average Number of
Banking Crises and Currency Crises per Country for Each Decade (1800-2010)

The average number of crises equals the number of crises divided by the number of
countries in the sample for each sub-period. The data in the second panel and the third
panel in Figure 1.10, which are similar to that in Panel B in Figure 1.7, show the average
number of banking crises and currency crises per country from 1800 to 2010. As this figure
shows, it is evident that often banking crises and currency crises occur simultaneously,
both lines peaking in the 1811-1810 period, the 1931-1940 period and the 1991-2000
period. At first glance, the growth rate of output per worker for each decade in a period of
more than an average number of banking crises and currency crises tends to be lower than
during other periods, indicating that these crises have an adverse impact on growth in the
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short run, i. e. for about a decade. There are some apparent outliers in figure 1.10, i.e.,
experienced high annual growth rate of output per worker of 11.09% in decade of 18411850, Venezuela experienced a high annual growth rate of output per worker of 10.53% in
decade of 1921-1930, and Equatorial Guinea experienced a high annual growth rate of
output per worker of 15.54% in decade of 1991-2000. The negative outlier is in Qatar,
which has annual growth rate of output per worker of -15.96% in decade of 1981-1990.

4. Estimation
In this section, we investigate the relationship between banking crises, currency
crises and growth, showing that our results are robust to the inclusion of variables
controlling for population growth, country effect, time effect and regional dummy variables.
In situations when the presence of unobservable, country-specific characteristics might
affect the dependent variable and might be correlated with the independent variables, fixed
effects models are particularly suitable. Moreover, they are generally appropriate when the
data come not from a random sample but instead are the universe of data available, as is
the situation here (For a discussion, see Hsiao, 1986.). In addition, our dataset covers 211
years, long enough to see the time effects on economic growth. Thus, we control for both
country effect and time effect in the panel analysis.

4.1 Baseline models
Equation (4.1.1) below represents the baseline model for panel regressions:
∆𝑦$3 = 𝛽' 𝐹𝐵$3 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝐶$3 + 𝜇$ + 𝜃3 + 𝛾′𝑋$3 + 𝜀$3
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(4.1.1)

∆𝑦$ = 𝛽> + 𝛽' 𝐹𝐵$ + 𝛽7 𝐹𝐶$ + 𝛾′𝑋$ + 𝜀$

(4.1.2)

where ∆𝒚𝒊𝒕 : is the average annual growth rate of output per worker for country 𝑖 during
period 𝑡(a specific time window), a value which equals the log difference of output per
worker; 𝑭𝑩𝒊𝒕 is the frequency of banking crisis, i.e., the average number of banking crises
country 𝑖 experienced per decade during period 𝑡; 𝑭𝑪𝒊𝒕 is the frequency of Currency Crisis,
i.e., the average number of currency crises country 𝑖 experienced per decade during period
𝑡. While there are times when a banking or currency crisis spans across the adjacent two
periods, if we count this banking crisis only in the first period, then its effect on growth in
the second period is not controlled for. To address this situation, we prorate this bridging
crisis over two periods. For example, a banking crisis begins in period 𝑡 − 1 and ends in
period 𝑡, with a duration of 𝐿 years; 𝐿' years of it fall in period 𝑡 − 1 and 𝐿 − 𝐿' years of
it fall in period 𝑡 , then period 𝑡 − 1 has 𝐿' 𝐿 of a banking crisis, and period 𝑡 has
(𝐿 − 𝐿' ) 𝐿 of a banking crisis, meaning the number of banking or currency crises can be
a percentage. The variable 	
  𝜇$ represents the country dummy and 𝜃3 the period dummy. In
addition, 𝑋$3 is the set of control variables: the log of output per worker in the initial year
for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡 and the average growth rate of population for country 𝑖 during
period 𝑡, and 𝜺𝒊𝒕 is the error term.
The coefficient 𝛽' in the equation measures how much the average growth rate of
output per worker changes if the average number of banking crises a country experienced
per decade increases by one, and similarly, coefficient 𝛽7 measures by how much the
average growth rate of output per worker changes if the average number of currency crises
per decade increases by one;
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Equation (4.1.2) represents the baseline model for cross-sectional regressions,
where ∆𝒚𝒊 is the average annual growth rate of output per worker for country 𝑖 during the
sample period, which equals the log difference of output per worker; 𝑭𝑩𝒊 represents the
frequency of banking crisis, i.e., the average number of banking crises country 𝑖
experienced per decade during the sample period; 𝑭𝑪𝒊 	
   is the frequency of currency crisis,
i.e., the average number of currency crises country 𝑖 experienced per decade during the
sample period; 𝑋$ represents the set of control variables for cross-sectional regressions,
which includes the log of output per worker in the initial year of the sample period, the
average growth rate of population during the sample period and regional dummies.

4.2. Endogeneity concern
In the absence of a theoretical growth model related to banking and currency crises
that offers a clear explanation of these determinants, panel analysis offers the advantage of
controlling for omitted (unobserved or mismeasured) variables. For example, the countries
that experienced banking and currency crises might have other factors that boost their
economy while those experiencing fewer such crises might not have, for example, a high
real income level, a developed capital market, or a strong institution and legal system. The
omission of such variables leads to an endogeneity problem. Because this research controls
for county and time effects, panel analyses are appropriate as they allow for controlling for
omitted variables without observing them.
The potential endogeneity problem caused by the reverse causality between the
average annual growth rate of output per worker and the number of banking and currency
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crises requires the former to affect the latter, a situation that may occur over ten years but
not over thirty or more years. Even if this reverse causality exists, it only leads the
correlation between growth rate of output per worker and the number of financial crises
toward negative direction, but our findings show that their relationship evolves from
negative to be positive. Hence, take one step back, the potential reverse causality is not
strong enough to dominate over the underlying positive relationship between long-term
growth rate of output per worker and the number of financial crises, which is one of our
most important findings in our research.
Hence, there is supposed to be no serious concern about endogeneity problem in
this research.

4.3. Multicollinearity Test
As mentioned in Section 2.5, the occurrence of banking crises and currency crises
is often interconnected. Table 1.5 provides the correlation coefficients between their
frequencies. Based on the “rule of thumb” test suggested by Anderson et al. (1990), any
correlation coefficient exceeding 0.7 indicates a potential problem. As seen in Table 1.5,
there are fairly low correlation coefficients between the frequency of banking crises and
the frequency of currency crises, with the largest being 0.564 for the time window of the
16 decades from 1850 to 2010. Thus, there is no significant multicollinearity between the
frequency of banking crises and the frequency of currency crises.
Table 1.5. Correlation Coefficients Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of
Currency Crisis for Various Time Windows
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Time window

Correlation

Time window

Correlation

1 decade

0.286

9 decades

0.472

2 decades

0.318

10 decades

0.474

3 decades

0.394

13 decades(1820-1950)

0.565

4 decades

0.376

13 decades(1880-2010)

0.537

5 decades

0.431

16 decades(1820-1980)

0.535

6 decades

0.516

16 decades(1850-2010)

0.564

7 decades

0.519

19 decades(1820-2010)

0.524

8 decades

0.481

The report of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the four independent variables is
shown in Table 1.6. None of the values in parenthesis is greater than 2.00, meaning there
is no significant multicollinearity among the four independent variables.
Table 1.6. Variance Inflation Factor
Frequency of

Frequency of

Log of Initial

Average Annual

Banking Crisis

Currency Crisis

Output per Worker

Growth Rate of
Population

1 decade

1.075

1.0180

1.060

1.006

2 decades

1.082

1.093

1.054

1.027

3 decades

1.142

1.095

1.045

1.017

4 decades

1.080

1.048

1.024

1.026

5 decades

1.111

1.067

1.022

1.023

6 decades

1.191

1.153

1.028

1.020

7 decades

1.243

1.235

1.024

1.092

8 decades

1.210

1.163

1.081

1.075

9 decades

1.216

1.165

1.189

1.074
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10 decades

1.208

1.039

1.166

1.273

13 decades(1820-1950)

1.467

1.204

1.299

1.056

13 decades(1880-2010)

1.601

1.272

1.277

1.431

16 decades(1820-1980)

1.432

1.152

1.293

1.111

16 decades(1850-2010)

1.651

1.270

1.196

1.222

19 decades(1820-2010)

1.550

1.172

1.336

1.178

4.4 Estimation Results
4.4.1. Panel regressions with fixed effects for both country and time
This section provides the panel analysis with fixed effects for both country and time
from the time window of 1 decade to 10 decades based on the baseline model in Equation
(4.1.1). Table 1.7 shows the panel regressions for the time windows of 1 decade and 2
decades, while Table 1.8 shows the panel regressions for time windows of 3 and 4 decades,
Table 1.9 for time windows of 5 and 6 decades, Table 1.10 for time windows of 7 and 8
decades and Table 1.11 for time windows of 9 and 10 decades.
The variables in these panel regressions include the dependent variable of average
annual growth rate of output per worker and the explanatory variables of frequency of
banking crisis, i.e., the average number of banking crises per decade; frequency of currency
crisis during each period, i.e., the average number of currency crises per decade; the log of
the output per worker in the initial year of each period; the average growth rate of
population during each period; and the country dummies and time dummies.

Table 1.7. Panel Analyses of 1 and 2 Decades Controlling for Country and Time Effects
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Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Time-window
Frequency of Banking Crisis

1 decade

2 decades

-0.0040 ***

-0.0042 ***

-0.0044 ***

-0.0032

-0.0035 *

-0.0037 *

(0.0014)

(0.0014)

(0.0014)

(0.0024)

(0.0022)

(0.0021)

-0.0030 **

-0.0037 ***

-0.0038 ***

-0.0024

-0.0038 **

-0.0041 **

(0.0013)

(0.0010)

(0.0013)

(0.0019)

(0.0016)

(0.0021)

Log of Initial Output per

-0.0155 ***

-0.0149 ***

-0.0187 ***

-0.0181 ***

Worker

(0.0015)

(0.0019)

(0.0020)

(0.0020)

Frequency of Currency Crisis

Growth Rate of Population

0.2200 ***

0.1648 **

(0.0638)

(0.0726)

Number of Countries

130

130

Number of Periods

20

10

1516

726

Number of Observations
R-squared

0.0145

0.0837

0.0987

0.0089

0.1760

0.1873

F statistics/

10.0415/

41.5093/

37.2854 /

2.7354/

42.2316/

34.1589/

P value

4.68e-05

< 2.22e-16

< 2.22e-16

0.0657

< 2.22e-16

< 2.22e-16

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients of the dummies of country and time are not reported

We divide the sample period for the time window of 1 decade into the 21 periods
of 1801-1810, 1811-1820, …, 2001-2010. Table 1.7 lists the six columns representing the
six regressions, each panel including three regressions. The R-squared, F-statistics/ P value
show the regression listed in the first column is outperformed by that listed in the second
and the third column. In addition, we can see that the coefficients of each variable remains
stable in terms of sign, magnitude and significance across the second column and the third
column. So we mainly look at the third column contains four variables of the coefficient.
For panel analysis of a time window of 1 decade, the coefficient on frequency of banking
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crisis is -0.0044 significant at a level of 1%, meaning that when the average number of
banking crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per
worker decreases by 0.44%. The coefficient on frequency of currency crisis is -0.0038
significant at a level of 1%, meaning that when the average number of currency crises
increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases
by 0.38%.
We divide sample period for the time window of 2 decades into the 10 periods of
1811-1830, 1831-1850, …, 1991-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. The coefficient on
frequency of banking crisis is -0.0037, significant at a level of 1%, meaning that when the
average number of banking crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth
rate of output per worker decreases by 0.37%. The coefficient on the frequency of currency
crisis is -0.0041, significant at a level of 1%, meaning that when the average number of
currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per
worker decreases by 0.41%.
Table 1.8. Panel Analyses of 3 and 4 Decades Controlling Country and Time Effects
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Time-window
Frequency of Banking Crisis

Frequency of Currency Crisis

Log of Initial Output per Worker

3 decades

4 decades

0.0013

-0.0006

-0.0012

0.0019

-0.0001

-0.0004

(0.0026)

(0.0022)

(0.0022)

(0.0031)

(0.0023)

(0.0023)

-0.0021

-0.0040 **

-0.0042 **

-0.0032

-0.0049 **

-0.0051 **

(0.0022)

(0.0017)

(0.0017)

(0.0032)

(0.0021)

(0.0020)

-0.0191 ***

-0.0183 ***

-0.0198 ***

-0.0192 ***
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(0.0021)
Growth rate of Population

Number of Countries

(0.0022)

(0.0022)

0.1408 *

0.0893

(0.0807)

(0.0787)

128

127

7

5

485

313

Number of Periods
Number of Observations

(0.0020)

R-squared

0.0039

0.2490

0.2571

0.0119

0.3276

0.3320

F statistics/

0.6838/

38.4725/

30.0331/

1.0861/

29.0645/

22.17/

P value

0.50538

< 2.22e-16

< 2.22e-16

0.33975

2.3326e-15

7.2424e-15

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients on the dummies of country and time are not reported

We divide the sample period for the time window of 3 decades into the 7 periods
of 1801-1830, 1831-1860, …, 1981-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For the panel analysis of
this time window, the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is statistically significant
at -0.0012, meaning that when the average number of banking crises increases by one per
decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker per decade decreases by 0.12%.
The coefficient of frequency of currency crisis is -0.0042, significant at a level of 5%,
meaning that when the average number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the
average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.42%.
We divide the sample period for the time window of 4 decade into the 5 periods of
1811-1850, 1851-1891, …, 1971-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. The coefficient of
frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to zero and statistically insignificant,
meaning that an increase in the average number of banking crises does not have a
statistically significant effect on the average annual growth rate of output per worker for
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the time window of 4 decades. The coefficient of frequency of currency crisis is -0.0051,
significant at a level of 5%, meaning that when the average number of currency crises
increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases
by 0.51%.
Table 1.9. Panel Analyses of 5 and 6 decades Controlling Country and Time Effects
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Time-window
Frequency of Banking Crisis

5 decades

6 decades

-0.0012

-0.0009

-0.0011

0.0013

-0.0008

-0.0005

(0.0035)

(0.003)

(0.0026)

(0.0035)

(0.0019)

(0.0019)

Frequency of Currency

-0.0032

-0.0044 **

-0.0039 **

-0.0030

-0.0038 *

-0.0036 *

Crisis

(0.0036)

(0.0022)

(0.0022)

(0.0034)

(0.0022)

(0.0021)

Log of Initial Output per

-0.0202 ***

-0.0200 ***

-0.0187 ***

-0.0197 ***

Worker

(0.0018)

(0.0018)

(0.0014)

(0.0016)

Growth rate of Population

Number of Countries
Number of Periods
Number of Observations

0.0350

-0.0863

(0.1042)

(0.0882)

123

121

4

3

248

229

R-squared

0.0143

0.3942

0.3950

0.0088

0.5315

0.5359

F statistics/

0.8676/

25.816/

18.6196/

0.4631/

38.9418/

24.7223/

P value

0.4226

6.2024e-13

6.9124e-12

0.63059

< 2.22e-16

1.5685e-12

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients of dummies of country and time are not reported

We divide the sample period for the time window of 5 decades into the 4 periods
of 1811-1860, 1861-1910, …, 1961-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For this panel analysis,
the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is statistically insignificant at -0.0011,
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meaning that when the average number of banking crises increases by one per decade, the
average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.11%. The coefficient of
the frequency of currency crisis is -0.0039, significant at a level of 5%, meaning that when
the average number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual
growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.39%.
We divide the sample period for the time window of 6 decades into the 3 periods
of 1831-1890, 1891-1950, and 1951-2010. We mainly look at the third column contains
which contains four variables of the coefficient. For this panel analysis, the coefficient of
frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to zero and statistically insignificant,
meaning that an increase in the average number of banking crises does not have a
statistically significant effect on the average annual growth rate of output per worker for
this time window. The coefficient of the frequency of currency crisis is -0.0036, significant
at a level of 10%, meaning that when the average number of currency crises increases by
one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.36%.
Table 1.10. Panel Analyses of 7 and 8 Decades Controlling Country and Time Effects
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Time-window

7 decades

8 decades

Frequency of Banking

-0.0033

-0.0021

-0.0022

-0.0076

-0.0008

-0.0006

Crisis

(0.0041)

(0.0028)

(0.0029)

(0.0061)

(0.0029)

(0.0030)

Frequency of Currency

0.0007

-0.0021

-0.0021

-0.0020

-0.0045 *

-0.0045 *

Crisis

(0.0036)

(0.0027)

(0.0027)

(0.0034)

(0.0025)

(0.0026)

-0.0170 ***

-0.0169 ***

-0.0182 ***

-0.0187 ***

(0.0020)

(0.0020)

(0.0025)

(0.0026)

Log of Initial Output per
Worker
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Growth rate of

0.0220

-0.0336

Population

(0.1209)

(0.0785)

Number of Countries

64

61

Number of Periods

3

2

135

113

Number of Observations
R-squared

0.0064

0.4186

0.4191

0.0069

0.5013

0.5026

F statistics/

0.2145/

15.8442/

11.7215/

0.1705/

16.0848/

11.8735/

P value

0.8075

7.2801e-08

3.1578e-07

0.84371

2.2667e-07

9.5479e-07

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients of dummies of country and time are not reported.

We divide the sample period for the time window of 7 decades into the 3 periods
of 1801-1870, 1871-1940, and 1941-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the
third column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For panel analysis
of this time window, the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is insignificant at 0.0022, meaning that when the average number of banking crises increases by one per
decade, the average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.22%. The
coefficient of frequency of currency crisis is also -0.0021 and statistically insignificant,
meaning that when the average number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the
average annual growth rate of output per worker decreases by 0.21%.
We divide the sample period for the time window of 8 decades into the 2 periods
of 8 decades of 1851-1930 and 1931-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the
third column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For the panel
analysis, the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to zero and
statistically insignificant, meaning that an increase in the average number of banking crises
does not have a statistically significant effect on the average annual growth rate of output
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per worker for the time window of 8 decades. The coefficient of frequency of currency
crisis is -0.0045, significant at a level of 10%, meaning that when the average number of
currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of output per
worker decreases by 0.45%.
Table 1.11. Panel Analyses of 9 and 10 Decades Controlling Country and Time Effects
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Time-window

9 decades

10 decades

Frequency of

0.0050

-0.0002

0.0001

-0.0022

0.0015

-0.0001

Banking Crisis

(0.0071)

(0.0032)

(0.0033)

(0.0063)

(0.0016)

(0.0011)

Frequency of

-0.0010

-0.0048 *

-0.0048 *

-0.0071

-0.0065 **

-0.0066 **

Currency Crisis

(0.0037)

(0.0028)

(0.0018)

(0.0051)

(0.0025)

(0.0030)

Log of initial

-0.0146 ***

-0.0150 ***

-0.0168 ***

-0.0134 ***

Output per

(0.0014)

(0.0020)

(0.0015)

(0.0018)

Worker
Growth rate of

-0.0240

0.2488 ***

Population

(0.1029)

(0.0788)

Number of

60

56

2

2

112

73

Countries
Number of
Periods
Number of
Observations
R-squared

0.0107

0.5855

0.5859

0.1305

0.8195

0.8730

F statistics/

0.2670/

22.5999/

16.6268/

1.0504/

19.6808/

20.6203/

P value

0.76675

2.8831e-09

1.4812e-08

0.3758

4.0936e-05

2.6185e-05

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The coefficients of dummies of country and time are not reported
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We divide the sample period for the time window of 9 decades into the 2 periods
of 10 decades of 1831-1920, 1921-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For the panel analysis of
this time window, the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to
zero and statistically insignificant, meaning that an average increase in the number of
banking crises does not have a statistically significant effect on the average annual growth
rate of output per worker for the time window of 9 decades. The coefficient of frequency
of currency crisis is -0.0048, significant at a level of 10%, meaning that when the average
number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of
output per worker decreases by 0.48%.
We divide the sample period for the time window of 10 decades into the 2 periods
of 10 decades of 1811-1910, 1911-2010. For the same reason, we mainly look at the third
column contains which contains four variables of the coefficient. For the panel analysis of
this time window, the coefficient of frequency of banking crisis is negative but close to
zero and statistically insignificant, meaning that an increase in the average number of
banking crises does not have a statistically significant effect on the average annual growth
rate of output per worker for time window of 10 decades. The coefficient of frequency of
currency crisis is -0.0068, significant at a level of 5%, meaning that when the average
number of currency crises increases by one per decade, the average annual growth rate of
output per worker decreases by 0.68%.

4.4.2. Cross-sectional Regression
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Since the longest time window for panel analyses is 10 decades, to investigate the
relationship between banking crises, currency crises and growth in the long run, we extend
the time windows by conducting cross-sectional regressions for time windows of 13
decades, 16 decades and 19 decades. The variables in cross-sectional regressions include
the dependent variable of average annual growth rate of output per worker and the
explanatory variables of frequency of banking crisis, the average number of banking crises
a country experienced during the sample period; frequency of currency crisis, the average
number of currency crises a country experienced during the sample period; the log of initial
output per worker, the log of the output per worker in the beginning of the year during the
sample period; the average growth rate of population during the sample period; and the
regional dummy introduced in Table 1.2.
Table 1.12 presents cross-sectional regressions for the 2 time windows of 13
decades based on the baseline model in Equation (4.1.2), with the first regression being
from 1820 to 1950 and the second regression from 1880 to 2010.
Table 1.12. Crises and Growth: Cross-sectional Regressions for Time Window of 130 Years
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Explanatory Variables

1820-1950 (130 years)

1880-2010 (130 years)

0.0010

0.0390 ***

0.0370 ***

0.0421 ***

(0.0147)

(0.0095)

(0.0094)

(0.0083)

0.0072 **

0.0032

0.0039

0.0030 *

(0.0032)

(0.0023)

(0.0043)

(0.0021)

0.0026

-0.0015

-0.0020

0.0015

(0.0030)

(0.0032)

(0.0029)

(0.0022)

Intercept

Frequency of Banking Crisis

Frequency of Currency Crisis
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-0.0006

-0.0051 ***

-0.0024 *

-0.0039 ***

(0.0019)

(0.0012)

(0.0011)

(0.0009)

0.2270 ***

0.1715 ***

0.0227

(0.0762)

(0.0442)

(0.0690)

0.0128

0.0074 ***

(0.0016)

(0.0017)

0.0061

0.0066 ***

(0.0015)

(0.0016)

0.0044

0.0128 ***

(0.0016)

(0.0018)

0.0074

-0.0014

(0.0013)

(0.0026)

0.0097

0.0016

(0.0026)

(0.0018)

0.0086

0.00240

(0.0018)

(0.0026)

0.0049

0.0017

(0.0015)

(0.0017)

Log of Initial Output per Worker

Growth Rate of Population

Region: Western Countries

Region: Southern Europe

Region: Newly Industrialized Countries

Region: Sub-Saharan Africa

Region: Latin America

Region: Middle East

Region: North Africa

Number of countries

52

56

Adjusted R-squared

0.1822

0.7005

0.0240

0.6374

F statistics/

3.841/

11.85/

1.337/

9.79/

P value

0.008818

2.029e-09

0.2688

1.232e-08

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

For the cross-sectional regression of period 1820-1950, the first column represents
the regression without regional dummies, in which the coefficient of the frequency of the
banking crisis is statistically significant 0.0072 and that of the frequency of currency crisis
is statistically insignificant 0.0026. The second column under regression of period 18201950 represents the regression with regional dummies, in which both of coefficients of the
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frequency of banking crisis and the frequency of currency crisis are statistically
insignificant are 0.0032 and -0.0015 respectively.
Figure 1.11 plots the regression line between frequency of banking crisis and
frequency of currency crisis and average annual growth rate of output per worker for crosssectional regression of period 1820-1950. Figure 1.12 and figure 1.13 plot the regression
lines between frequency of banking crisis, frequency of currency crisis and average growth
rate of output per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1820-1950 with
regional dummies.

Figure 1.11 Regression Line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency
Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross- sectional Regression of 1820-1950
Without Regional Dummies.
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Figure 1.12 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross- sectional Regression of Period 1820-1950 with Regional Dummies.
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Figure 1.13 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Currency Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross- sectional Regression of Period 1820-1950 With Regional Dummies.

For the regression of period 1880-2010, the first column represents the regression
without regional dummies, in which the coefficients of the frequency of the banking crisis
and the frequency of currency crisis are statistically insignificant 0.0039 and -0.0020
respectively. The second column represents the regression with regional dummies, in
which the coefficient of the frequency of banking crisis is statistically significant 0.0030
and the frequency of currency crisis is statistically insignificant -0.0015 respectively.
Figure 1.14 plots regression lines between frequency of banking crisis and average
growth rate of output per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1880-2010
with regional dummies. Figure 1.15 and figure 1.16 plot the regression lines between
frequency of banking crisis, frequency of currency crisis and average growth rate of output
per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1880-2010 with regional dummies.
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Figure 1.14 Regression Line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency Crisis and
Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross-sectional Regression of 1880-2010 Without
Regional Dummies.

Figure 1.15 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1880-2010 With Regional Dummies.

49

Figure 1.16 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Currency Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1880-2010 With Regional Dummies.

Table 1.13 presents the cross-sectional regressions for the 2 time windows of 16
decades based on the baseline model in Equation (4.1.2), with the first regression being
from 1820 to 1980 and the second from 1850 to 2010.

Table 1.13. Crises and Growth: Cross-Sectional Regressions for the Time Window of 160 Years
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Explanatory
1820-1980 (160 years)

1850-2010 (160 years)

Variables
0.0139

0.0342 ***

0.0244 **

0.0342 ***

(0.0171)

(0.0088)

(0.0196)

(0.0088)

Intercept
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Frequency of

0.0084 *

0.0022

0.0037

0.0022

Banking Crisis

(0.0042)

(0.0030)

(0.0032)

(0.0030)

Frequency of

-0.0004

-0.0006

-0.0000

-0.0006

Currency Crisis

(0.0026)

(0.0027)

(0.0029)

(0.0027)

-0.0003

-0.0039 ***

-0.0012

-0.0039 ***

(0.0021)

(0.0011)

(0.0014)

(0.0011)

Growth Rate of

0.1137

0.0955 **

-0.0140

0.0955 **

Population

(0.0780)

(0.0400)

(0.0858)

(0.0400)

Log of Initial
Output per
Worker

Region: Western

0.0121 ***

0.0121 ***

Countries

(0.0015)

(0.0015)

Region: Southern

0.0098 ***

0.0098 ***

Europe

(0.0020)

(0.0020)

0.0093 ***

0.0093 ***

(0.0017)

(0.0017)

Region: Sub-

0.0065 ***

0.0065 ***

Saharan Africa

(0.0016)

(0.0016)

Region: Latin

0.0086 ***

0.0086 ***

America

(0.0020)

(0.0020)

Region: Middle

0.0089 ***

0.0089 ***

East

(0.0019)

(0.0019)

Region: North

0.0055 ***

0.0055

Africa

(0.0017)

(0.0017)

Region: Newly
Industrialized
Countries

Number of
52

52

countries
Adjusted R0.03747

0.6823

-0.04646

squared

51

0.6613

F statistics/

1.496/

10.96/

0.4339/

10.05/

P value

0.2185

6.106e-09

0.7834

2.005e-08

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

For the cross-sectional regression of period 1820-1980, the first column represents
the regression without regional dummies, in which the coefficient of the frequency of the
banking crisis is statistically significant 0.0084 and that of the frequency of currency crisis
is statistically insignificant -0.0004. The second column under regression of period 18201980 represents the regression with regional dummies, in which both of coefficients of the
frequency of banking crisis and the frequency of currency crisis are statistically
insignificant are 0.0022 and -0.0006 respectively.
Figure 1.17 plots the regression line between frequency of banking crisis and
frequency of currency crisis and average annual growth rate of output per worker for crosssectional regression of period 1820-1980. Figure 1.18 and figure 1.19 plots the regression
lines between frequency of banking crisis and average growth rate of output per worker of
each region for cross-regression of period 1820-1980 with regional dummies.
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Figure 1.17 Regression Line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency Crisis and
Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-1980 Without
Regional Dummies.
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Figure 1.18 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-1980 With Regional Dummies.

Figure 1.19 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Currency Crisis and Average Growth Rate of
Output Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-1980 With Regional
Dummies.

For the regression of period 1880-2010, the first column represents the regression
without regional dummies, in which the coefficients of the frequency of the banking crisis
is statistically insignificant 0.0037 and that of the frequency of currency crisis is almost
close to zero respectively. The second column represents the regression with regional
dummies, in which the coefficient of the frequency of banking crisis is statistically
significant 0.0022 and the frequency of currency crisis is statistically insignificant -0.0006
respectively.
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Figure 1.20 plots regression lines between frequency of banking crisis and average
growth rate of output per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1880-2010
with regional dummies. Figure 1.21 and figure 1.22 plot the regression lines between
frequency of banking crisis, frequency of currency crisis and average growth rate of output
per worker of each region for cross-regression of period 1880-2010 with regional dummies.

Figure 1.20 Regression line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency Crisis and
Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross-sectional Regression of 1880-2010 without regional
Dummies.
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Figure 1.21 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of period 1880-2010 With Regional Dummies.

Figure 1.22 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Currency Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1880-2010 With Regional Dummies.
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Table 1.14 presents the cross-sectional regressions for the time windows of 16
decades from 1820-1980 based on the baseline model in Equation (4.1.2).

Table 1.14. Crises and Growth: Cross-sectional Regressions for Time Window of 190 Years
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of output per worker
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Explanatory Variables

1820-2010 (190 years)
0.0299 **

0.0345 ***

(0.0131)

(0.0082)

0.0073 **

0.0021

(0.0033)

(0.0018)

-0.0012

0.0014

(0.0025)

(0.0022)

-0.0023

-0.0035 ***

(0.0016)

(0.0010)

0.0381

0.0720 *

(0.0829)

(0.0401)

Intercept

Frequency of Banking Crisis

Frequency of Currency Crisis

Log of Initial Output per Worker

Growth Rate of Population
0.0074 ***
Region: Western Countries
(0.0011)
0.0056
Region: Southern Europe
(0.0012)
Region: Central and Eastern Europe
0.0088 ***
Region: Newly Industrialized Countries
(0.0012)
0.0017
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa
(0.0012)
Region: Latin America

0.0022

57

(0.0014)
0.0025
Region: Middle East
(0.0019)
0.0020
Region: North Africa
(0.0013)
Number of countries

52

Adjusted R-squared

0.0114

0.7008

F statistics/

1.147/

11.86/

P value

0.346

1.999e-09

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

For the cross-sectional regression of period 1820-2010, the first column represents
the regression without regional dummies, in which the coefficient of the frequency of the
banking crisis is statistically significant 0.0073 and that of the frequency of currency crisis
is statistically insignificant -0.0012. The second column under regression of period 18202010 represents the regression with regional dummies, in which both of coefficients of the
frequency of banking crisis and the frequency of currency crisis are statistically
insignificant are 0.0021 and 0.0014 respectively.
Figure 1.23 plots the regression line between frequency of banking crisis and
frequency of currency crisis and average annual growth rate of output per worker for crosssectional regression of period 1820-2010. Figure 1.24 and figure 1.25 plot the regression
lines between frequency of banking crisis and average growth rate of output per worker of
each region for cross-regression of period 1820-2010 with regional dummies.
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Figure 1.23 Regression Line Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Frequency of Currency
Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output Per Worker for Cross-sectional Regression of 1820-2010
Without Regional Dummies.
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Figure 1.24 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-2010 With Regional Dummies.

Figure 1.25 Regression Lines Between Frequency of Banking Crisis and Average Growth Rate of Output
Per Worker of Each Region for Cross-sectional Regression of Period 1820-2010 With Regional Dummies.

4.4.3. Estimation Summary
Table 1.15 shows the summary of the coefficients of frequency of banking crisis
and frequency of currency crisis for the regression with all of the four independent
variables, i.e., frequency of banking crisis, frequency of currency crisis, log of initial GDP
per capita and average growth rate of Population. The P values are reported in the
parentheses below the estimates.
Table 1.15. Summary of Coefficients of Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis
(P values are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
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Time

Model

window

1 decade

2 decades

3 decades

4 decades

5 decades

6 decades

7 decades

8 decades

9 decades

10

Panel

Panel

Panel

Panel

Panel

Panel

Panel

Panel

Panel

Panel

decades

Coefficient on

Coefficient on

Number of

Number of

Frequency of

Frequency of

Countries

Observations

Banking

Currency

Crisis

Crisis

-0.004 ***

-0.004 ***

130

1516

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.004 *

-0.004 **

130

726

(0.075)

(0.010)

-0.001

-0.004 **

128

485

(0.602)

(0.016)

-0.000

-0.005 **

127

313

(0.869)

(0.015)

-0.001

-0.004 ***

123

248

(0.695)

(0.045)

-0.000

-0.004 *

121

229

(0.813)

(0.097)

-0.002

-0.002

64

135

(0.452)

(0.439)

-0.001

-0.005 *

64

113

(0.852)

(0.087)

0.000

-0.005 *

61

112

(0.986)

(0.093)

-0.000

-0.007 *

56

73

(0.957)

(0.014)

13

Cross

0.003

-0.000

52 for 1820-

52 for 1820-

decades

section

(0.116)

(0.573)

1950

1950

61

56 for 1880-

56 for 1880-

2010

2010

16

Cross

0.002

0.001

52 for 1820-

52 for 1820-

decades

section

(0.394)

(0.544)

1980

1980

52 for 1850-

52 for 1850-

2010

2010

52

52

19

Cross

0.002

0.001

decades

section

(0.248)

(0.521)

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
Note: 1) The coefficients and corresponding P value for cross sectional regressions of time windows of 13
decades are average values over regressions of time windows 1820-1950 and 1880-2010.
2) The coefficients and corresponding P value for cross sectional regressions of time windows of 16
decades are average values over regressions of time windows 1820-1880 and 1850-2010.

Figure 1.26 shows graphically the tabular information in Table 1.15. The one
small difference between the two is that Table 1.15 rounds the coefficients to the fourth
decimal place while Figure 1.26 rounds them to the seventh decimal place.
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Figure 1.26. Coefficients of Frequency of Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis for Different Time Windows

As this figure shows, we can see an obvious upward-sloping trend, with the blue
line representing the coefficients of the frequency of banking crisis, and the purple line the
coefficients of the frequency of currency crisis. The green dot represents the statistically
significant coefficients of the frequency of banking crisis, while the red dot represents the
significant coefficients of the frequency of currency crisis. It is clear that the coefficients
of frequency of banking crisis remain significantly negative from time window of 1 decade
to 2 decades, their negative effects gradually turning positive, while the coefficients of
frequency of currency crisis have more significantly negative values overall, and both the
coefficient of frequency of banking crisis and the coefficient of frequency of currency crisis
turn positive as the time window increases to 13 decades.
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Some of the coefficients of frequency of banking crisis and frequency of currency
crisis are not statistically significant, but economically significant, since they are of great
magnitude.
Since financial risk-taking lies behind financial crisis, then the net effect of
financial risk-taking remains significantly negative in the short run, changing to positive,
though statistically insignificant, in the longer run. It is noteworthy that currency crises are
more destructive than banking crises overall. In other words, since a currency crisis is the
realization of potential risks that are more foreign-involved in a severe speculative attack,
roughly speaking, the price for a country to take more financial risk to finance investment
and further economic growth (risky path) is much higher when international dimensions of
risks are involved than in circumstances without international dimensions of risks.

5. Conclusion remarks
Financial development boosts economic growth while financial crises are typically
associated with slower economic growth. As financial crises have been occurring more
frequently, more research exploring the relationship between them and growth is being
conducted. Due to data availability, most of these studies focus on the short-run. However,
it is not clear which one of the two effects dominate economic growth across countries in
the long-run.
In this paper, we use a multi-country dataset to address the relationship between the
long-term nexus between banking crises, currency crises and growth. To broaden the
current datasets, we combine the three leading datasets of financial crises from Bordo et
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al. (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia(2013) and a dataset of
output per worker and growth rate of population from Tamura et al. (2016). This composite
dataset covers 130 economies from around the world, some from 1800 with the rest
beginning in later years.
Our panel analyses and cross-sectional analyses show that the coefficients of
frequency of banking crisis remain significantly negative from time window of 1 decade
to 2 decades, with its negative effect turning positive gradually, while the coefficients of
frequency of currency crisis have more statistically significantly negative values overall,
and both coefficient of frequency of banking crisis and coefficient of frequency of currency
crisis turn positive when the time window increases to 13 decades.
We find the effects of both the frequency of banking crisis and the frequency of
currency crisis remain significantly negative in the short run, changing positive though
statistically insignificant in the longer run. While the frequency of currency crisis has much
more adverse effect on growth from short run to medium run (10 decades) than the
frequency of banking, though both effects on growth become insignificantly positive in the
longer run. In other words, the net effect of banking crisis on growth is relatively less
destructive than the net effect of currency crisis in the short run, though both seem to boost
growth in the long run (longer than 10 decades).
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APPENDIX
Table A1. List of Banking crises and Currency crises from 1800 to 2010 for 153 countries
Banking crises

Currency crises

Algeria

1990-1994

1988;1944

Argentina

1890-1891

1885;1890;1908;1914;19291932;1950;1959;1962;1967;1975;1980;1987;2002

Australia

1828;1843;1893

1915;1932-1933;1949

Austria

1873;1924;1929;1931;2008-2010

1800-1801;1804;1807;1813;1815-1817;18501851;1853;1856;18591960;1863;1866;1915;1918;1923;1933;1945-1850

Bangladesh

1987

1976

Belgium

1838-1839;1842;1848;1870-

1914;1924;1935;1938;1949

1871;1914;19251926;1931;1934;1939;2008-2010
Bolivia

1986;1994

1932-1933;19361937;1950;1953;1956;1958;1963;1973;1981

Botswana
Brazil

1984
1890-1891;1897;1900-

1818-1816;1820-1821;1827-

1901;1914;1923;1963;1990-1998

1829;1837;1842;1868;1889;1898;1914;19301931;1934;1937;1959;19621963;1965;1976;1982;1987;1992;1999

Burkina Faso

1990-1994

1994

Burundi

1994-1998

Cameroon

1987-1912;1995-197

Cape Verde

1993

Canada

1837;1866;1923

1891;1893;1908;1914;1921;1929;1931;1950;1962

Central African

1976;1995-1996

1943-1944;1959;1994

Chad

1983;1992-1996

1994

Chile

1889;1898;1907;1914;1925;1976;1981-1985

1887;1889;1898;1931;1953;1962;1968;1972;1982

Colombia

1982;1998-2000

1906;1909;1920;1932;1951;1962;1965;1967;1985

1994

Rep
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Comoros

1994

Congo, Rep

1992

1994

Costa Rica

1987-1991;1994-1995

1920;1922;1933;1935;1981;1991

Denmark

1813;1857;1885;1907;1914;1931;2008-2010

1914;1921-1922;1931-1932

Djibouti

1991-1995

Dominican Rep

2003-2004

1985;1990;2003

Ecuador

1982-1986;1998-2002

1921-1922;1924;1931;1934-1935;1938;1982;1999

Egypt

1907;1980

1949;1962;1979;1990

El Salvador

1989

1986

Equatorial Guinea

1983

1980;1994

Eritrea

1993

Estonia

1992-1994

1992

Fiji

1998

Finland

1990;1921;1931;1939;1991-1995

1914;1921;1931;1949;1993

France

1802;1805;1882;1889;1907;1930-

1813-1814;1816;1888;1914;1923;1926;1936-

1932;2008-2010

1937;1948;1957;1968

Gabon

1994

Gambia

1985;2003

Germany

1857;1901;1931

1913-1815;19621863;1872;1893;1907;1914;1931;1934;1949

Ghana

1982-1983

1949;1967;1978;1983;1993;2000;2009

Greece

1931;2008-2010

1885;1914;1931-1932;1950;1983

Guatemala

1986

Guinea

1985;1993

1982;2005

Guinea-Bissau

1995-1998

1980;1994

Guyana

1983

1987

Haiti

1994-1998

1992;2003

Honduras

1990

Iceland

2008-2010

1932;1947;1950;1960;1975;1981;1989;2008

India

1863;1866;1908;1913-1916;1921-

1894;1920-1921;1950;1967

1922;1929-1931;1947-1948;1993
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Indonesia

1997-2001

1948-1949;1952-1954;1957-1959;1962-1964;19661968;1979;1998

Iran

1985;1993;2000

Ireland

1836;1856;2008-2010

1865;1919;1931;1939;1967

Israel

1977

1975;1980;1985

Italy

1866;1868;1891;1893;1907;1914;1921;1930-

1894;1908;1935-1936;1964;1981

1931;1935;2008-2010
Ivory coast

1988-1992

1943-1944;1994

Jamaica

1996-1998

1978;1983;1991

Japan

1901;1907;1917;1927;1997-2001

1864;1900;1904;1908;1917;1921;1931-1932

Jordan

1989-1991

1989

Kenya

1985;1992-1994

1993

Kuwait

1982-1995

Latvia

1995;2008-2010

1992

Lebanon

1990-1993

1984;1990

Lesotho

1985

Liberia

1991-1994

Lithuania

1995-1996

Luxembourg

2008-2010

Madagascar

1988

1992

1984;1994;2004

Malawi

1994

Malaysia

1997-1999

1902;1920;1948;1998

Mali

1987-1991

1994

Mauritania

1984

1993

Mexico

1981-1985;1994-1996

1914;1931;1938;1948;1954;1977;1982;1995

Morocco

1980-1984

1918;1921;1929-1931;1943-1944;1947;1949-1950;19581959;1981

Mozambique

1987-1991

1987

Myanmar

1975;1990;1996;2001;2007

Namibia

1984

Nepal

1988

1984;1992

Netherlands

1819-1929;1897;1914;1921;1939;2008-2010

1914;1914;1921;1923;1935;1949
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New zealand

1890-1895

1967;1984

Nicaragua

1990-1993;2000-2001

1903-1905;1907;1909;1911-1912;19371939;1946;1979;1985;1990

Niger

1983-1985

1994

Nigeria

1991-1995;2009-2010

1950;1983;1989;1997

Norway

1814;1921-1923;1931;1991-1993

1820-1821;1864;1914;1931;1949

Pakistan
Panama

1972
1988-1989

Papua New

1995

Guinea
Paraguay

1890;1995

1920;1930-1931;1933;1935-1936;1941;1943;1951;19541956;1958;1984;1989;2002

Peru

1872-1876;1983

1921;1930;1932;19381939;1950;1953;1958;1968;1976;1981;1988

Philippines

1983-1986;1997-2001

1962;1983;1998

Portugal

1828;1846-

1801;1815;1891;1931;1983

1847;1891;1920;1923;1931;2008-2010
Rwanda

1991

Senegal

1988-1991

1994

Sierra Leone

1990-1994

1983;1989;1998

Singapore

1892-1894;1901-1902;1920;1950

Slovak Rep

1998-2002

South Africa

1865-1869;1877;1881;1890-1892

1933;1940;1950;1967;1984

South Korea

1997-1998

1946;1948-1952;1954-1955;1962-1963;1966;1998

Spain

1814-1817;1829;1846-1847;1920;1924-

1931;1958;1967;1983

1925;1931;1977-1981;2008-2010
Sri Lanka

1989-1991

1920;1931;1939;1956;1968;1978

Sudan

1981;1988;1993

Suriname

1990;1995;2001

Swaziland

1995-1999

1985

Sweden

1811-1814;1897;1907;1931-1932;1991-

1815;1819;1914;1931-1932;1949;1993

1935;2008-2010
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Switzerland

1870;1931;1933;2008-2010

1964;1914;1936;1939

Syria

1988

Taiwan

1946;1950;1955

Thailand

1983;1997-2000

1985;1990

Tanzania

1987-1988

1862-1963;1883;1894;1922;1932;1942;1950;1954;1998

Togo

1993-1994

1994

Tunisia

1991

1944;1946;1949-1950;1958;1965

Turkey

1931;1982-1984;2000-2001

1809-1810;1820;1822;1828-1829;1831;1862-1863;19201921;1946;1957;1959;1978;1984;1991;1996;2001

Turkmenistan

2008

Uganda

1994

1980;1988

United Kingdom

1810-1811;1815;1825;1837-1840;1847-

1815;1914;1931;1947;1949;1961;1964-1968

1850;1857;1866;1890;2007-2010
United States

1818-1819;1825;1836-

1814;1862;1876;1891-1892;1933;1960

1839;1857;1884;1893;1907;1914;19301933;2007-2010
Uruguay

1893;1898;1981-1985;2002-2005

1919;1930-1931;1938-1939;1948-1949;1957-1958;19631965;1967-1968;1972;1983;1990;2002

Venezuela

1994-1998

1984;1989;1994;2002

Zaire

1983;1991-1998

1976;1983;1989;1994;1999;2009

Zambia

1995-1998

1950;1983;1989;1996;2009

Zimbabwe

1995-1999

1983;1991;1998;2003

Note: There are 248 banking crises and 458 currency crises in our sample.
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CHAPTER TWO
CAPITAL ACCOUNT OPENNESS AND GROWTH
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of capital account openness on growth using two
measurements of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL (1955-2004) and The Chinn-Ito
Index (1970-2014). I find that capital account openness had a positive effect on 5-year
average growth, 10-year average growth and 20-year average growth based on panel
analyses, but an insignificant even negative effect on growth in the long run based on crosssectional regressions. The results are robust to controlling country dummy and time dummy.
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1. Introduction
The effect of capital account openness on economic growth has received
considerable attention. As the proponents claim, capital account openness, in certain
circumstances increases efficient allocation of international capital, while capital control
incurs high administrative costs of imposing capital controls, capital control has possible
prevention of adaptation to changing international circumstances, and necessary
adjustments in policies in the context of financial globalization might be postponed.
While the opponents claim that international capital flows tend to be highly
sensitive to macroeconomic policies, to the soundness of the banking system and to
economic and political developments. Inflows might be excessive which cause instability.
On the other hand, capital controls are effective in reaching the intended goal; and controls
may help to support a weak financial system, and controls on inflows seem to make
monetary policy more independent.
The evidence of the effect of capital account openness on growth is not so clear.
Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) find no association between the levels of capital
account openness and growth for advanced industrial nations. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti
(1995) find no effects of capital account openness on growth in emerging market nations.
The most widely cited study of the correlation of capital account liberalization with growth
is Rodrik (1998), which finds no correlation between capital account liberalization and
growth, based on a sample of 100 industrial and developing countries for the period 19751989.
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Quinn (1997), however, shows that changes in capital account openness are
associated with higher long-run growth. Henry (2000) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) find
that stock market liberalizations decrease the cost of capital, which leads to greater
investment and increased per-worker output, at least in the immediate aftermath of
liberalization.
As Eichengreen (2001) points out that neither theoretical models nor empirical
analyses has highly consensus on whether capital account openness has significant positive
effect on growth.
Edwards (2001) finds capital account liberalization has strong positive effect on
growth for 10-year intervals, however, limited mainly to high-income countries. Using
Edwards’s data, Arteta et al (2001) analyze the 10-year average of the growth rate for 61
countries from 1980 to 1989, find the effects vary with time, with how capital account
liberalization is measured, and with how the relationship is estimated. There is some
evidence that the positive growth effects of liberalization are stronger in countries with
strong institutions, as measured by standard indicators of the rule of law, but only weak
evidence that the benefits grow with a country’s financial depth and development. They
also find that macroeconomic imbalances that could possibly create avenue for capital
flight such as black market premiums.
MW Klein (2003) finds an inverted-U shaped relationship between growth and
capital account openness with respect to income per capita. Middle-income countries
benefit significantly from liberalizing capital account while rich and poor countries do not.
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Henry (2003) shows when countries liberalize their capital accounts and stock
markets, the costs of capital to industrial firms are reduced, and further boosts growth.
Arteta et al. (2001) find only limited evidence of a positive growth effect when capital
account openness is conditioned on law and order. Klein (2005) finds that capital account
liberalization in countries with better institutions does promote growth.
In contrast, Quinn and Toyoda (2008) find no evidence that capital account
liberalization positively affects economic growth, even though it has a high level of
institutional quality.
Klein et al (2008) show a statistically significant and economically relevant effect
of open capital accounts on financial depth and economic growth in a cross-section of
countries over the periods 1986–1995 and 1976–1995, however, these results are mainly
driven by OECD countries included in the sample.
Henry (2007) points out, neoclassical theory predicts only temporary growth effects
on a country’s transition to a new steady state, helping to understand that most papers do
not find clear evidence for a relationship between capital account liberalization and growth.
He criticizes most of the existing empirical literature by “analysing capital account
liberalization at the level of the firm instead of the country provides greater clarity about
the channels through which liberalization affects the real economy.” (p. 889). Bussière and
Fratzscher(2008) find that a time-varying relationship between financial openness and
growth for 45 industrialized and emerging market economies: countries tend to gain in the
short term, immediately following capital account liberalization, but may not grow faster
or even experience temporary growth reversals in the medium to long term.
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G Bekaert et al (2011) show that the growth boost from openness outweighs the
detrimental loss in growth from global or regional banking crises. The countries that are
more financially developed or have higher quality of institutions experience larger
productivity growth responses.
Kunieda et al (2014) investigate the data from 1985 to 2009 for 109 countries, and
find that empirical evidence indicating that capital account liberalization is beneficial to
less corrupt countries, but is disadvantageous to highly corrupt countries.
This paper examines the effect of capital account openness on growth using two
measurements of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL (1955-2004) and the Chinn-Ito
Index (1970-2014). I find that capital account openness had positive effect on 5-year
average growth, and 10-year average growth and 20-year average growth, but
insignificantly negative effect on longer-run growth.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the prevalent measures of
capital account openness in the literature. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses.
Sections 4 concludes.

2. Measure of Capital Account Openness
2.1. De Jure Measures
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Figure 2.1. Categories of AREAER
Researches on the effect of capital account liberalization on growth are limited by
data availability. The first commonly used data is from the IMF’s annual publication,
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (henceforth
AREAER), from 1966 to 1995, whose categories are shown in Figure 2.1. It is often
considered to be too rough, however, as the de jure 0, 1 indicator (hereafter, IMF_BINARY)
of the presence of absence of capital controls take the countries substantially but no
completely open with countries that are completely closed as one category. In addition,
IMF_BINARY reports restrictions only on residents without any information about
nonresident capital account restrictions on, e.g., inward foreign direct investment (see
Quinn and Toyoda, 2008).
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Another leading measure of capital account openness is created by Chinn and Ito
(2008), called KAOPEN. Construction of KAOPEN is based on the four binary dummy
variables reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER). These variables are: i) variable indicating the presence of multiple
exchange rates; ii) variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions; iii)
variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions; and iv) variable indicating
the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. These variables are to provide
information on the extent and nature of the restrictions on external accounts for a wide
cross-section of countries.
These studies have all made progress based on the original 0, 1 dummy. However,
they still simply measure the presence or absence of controls in a given category. One of
new indexes called CAPITAL was created and updated recently (Quinn and Toyoda, 2008)
go beyond this limitation. Quinn (1997) constructs indicators on capital account
(CAPITAL) and financial current account (FIN_CURRENT) regulations based on a coding
of the AREAER text. They measure only if there is restriction, but how severe of those
restrictions.

2.2 De Facto and Hybrid De Facto/De Jure Measures
De jure measures have the advantage of reflecting the institutional development.
However, the capital controls on paper in many countries may be very strict, but there is
no practical effect. On the contrary, many other countries are legally open to foreign capital,
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but the actual transaction of capital is not so active. Then the de jure measure does not
reflect the degree of capital market openness.
On the other hand, the advantage of de facto measures is that it reflects the actual
transaction of the capital, but it suffers from measurement errors. This justifies why hybrid
de facto / de jure measures are developed (see Quinn and Toyoda, 2008).
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) Index (TOTAL) may be one of the most widely
used de facto indicators, TOTAL is calculated as the total assets of the state plus the
liabilities relative to the gross domestic product. (Edison and Warnock, 2003), the
convergence of external and domestic interest rates (Dooley, Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez,
1997; Quinn and Jacobson, 1989). Sub-index of Control of capital movement and people
of Economic freedom index from Fraser institute (henceforth, EF), whose rating starts at 0
to 10 in three aspects: i) Foreign ownership / investment restrictions; ii) Capital controls.
iii) Freedom of foreigners to visit. There are some other hybrid measures of capital account
openness in the literature (see details, QUINN et al, 2011)

3. Data
This paper adopts two measures of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL(Quinn
and Toyoda, 2008) and the version of KAOPEN(Chinn and Ito, 2008) in 2014. CAPITAL
covers 94 countries for period 1955-2004 and KAOPEN covers 182 countries for period
1970-2014. In addition, the data of GDP and population are collected from Penn World
Tables version 9.0, which cover 182 countries for period 1950-2014.
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I use two different measures of capital account openness for comparison, so there
are two sets of regressions in this paper, one set of regressions based on data of GDP per
capita, Population growth and CAPITAL, which cover 94 countries from 1955 to 2004,
the other set of regressions are based on the data of GDP per capita, Population growth
and KAOPEN, which cover 155 countries from 1970 to 2014.
Table 2.1 shows the definitions and sources of the variables used in this paper.
Table 2.1. Definitions and Sources of Variables
Variable

Definition and construction

Source

GDP per capita

In 2011 US dollars

PWT 9.0

Growth rate of GDP per capita

Log difference of GDP per capita

PWT 9.0

Growth rate of Population

Log difference of Population

PWT 9.0

CAPITAL

Measure of capital account openness

Quinn and Toyoda(2008)

KAOPEN

Measure of capital account openness

The Chinn-Ito Index(2015)

Western Countries : 1
Southern Europe : 2
Central and Eastern Europe : 3
Newly Industrialized Countries : 4
Region Dummy

Asia : 5

Tamura et al(2016)

Sub-Saharan Africa : 6
Latin America : 7
Middle East : 8
North Africa : 9

Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of the dataset.
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics
Statistics

Number of

Mean
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Median

Min

Max

Std Deviation

countries
Growth rate of GDP per capita

182

0.04168

0.04326

- 0.16900

1.11667

0.08719

Growth rate of Population

182

0.01842

0.01903

-0.19901

0.17625

0.01619

CAPITAL

94

55.75915

50

0

100

28.9838

KAOPEN

155

0.44129

0.30201

0

1

0.35874

Figure 2.1 depicts CAPITAL from 1950 to 2004, Figure 1.3 depicts KAOPEN from
1970 to 2014 and Figure 2.4 depicts the growth rate of GDP per capita for countries from
1950 to 2014.

Figure 2.2. Cross-country average of CAPITAL from 1948 to 2004
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Figure 2.3. Cross-country average of KAOPEN from 1970 to 2014

Figure 2.4. Growth rate of GDP per capita from 1950 to 2014
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4. Model and Estimation
When there exist unobservable, country-specific characteristics, which might affect
the dependent variable and might be correlated with the independent variables, fixed effects
models are particularly suitable. Moreover, because these data are not from a random
sample, but are the universe of data that are available, fixed effects models are generally
appropriate. (see Hsiao, 1986 for detail). In addition, the datasets of CAPITAL and
KAOPEN cover 50 years and 45 years respectively, there is no reason to ignore the time
effects across time windows of 5 years, 10 years and 20 years. Henceforth we control both
country effect and time effect in panel analysis, though most of the papers mentioned above
do not take time effect into consideration, which might be misleading.

4.1 Baseline models
1) Panel regression
∆𝑦$3 = 𝛽> + 𝛽' 𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 + 𝛽7 ∆𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 + 𝛽N 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐$3 + 𝛽V 𝑔_𝑝𝑜𝑝$3 + 𝜇$ + 𝜀$3
(3.1.1)
2) Cross-sectional regression
∆𝑦$ = 𝛽> + 𝛽' 𝐶𝐴𝑂$ + 𝛽7 ∆𝐶𝐴𝑂$ + 𝛽N 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐$ + 𝛽V 𝑔_𝑝𝑜𝑝$ + 𝛽X 𝑅$ + 𝜀$
(3.1.2)
(3.1.1) represents the baseline model for panel regressions, where ∆𝒚𝒊𝒕 represents
the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡, which
equals log difference of GDP per capita; 𝜇$ represents country dummy.
𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 and ∆𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 	
  are the two core variables in baseline model. 𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 represents
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the measure capital account openness(CAPITAL or KAOPEN in this paper) in the initial
year for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡, and ∆𝐶𝐴𝑂$3 represents the change of capital account
openness during period 𝑡. This paper attempts to examine if high level of capital account
openness brings higher growth, and if capital account liberalization (change in capital
account openness) boosts growth.
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐$3 and 𝑔_𝑝𝑜𝑝$3 are the control variables, 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙. 𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐$3
represents log of GDP per capita in the initial year for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡, and
𝑔_𝑝𝑜𝑝$3 	
  represents average annual growth rate of Population for country 𝑖 during period 𝑡.
𝜺𝒊𝒕 : Error term.
(3.1.2) stands for the baseline model for cross-sectional regressions, which is
similar to panel regression (3.1.1), the difference is cross-section model uses regional
dummy instead of country dummy in panel model.

4.2. Estimation results
4.2.1 Panel regressions controlling country effect and time effect
This sub-section provides panel analysis for time windows of 5 years, 10 years, 15
years, 20 years based on baseline model (3.1.1). Table 2.3 shows panel regressions of time
window of 5 years, Table 2.4 shows panel regressions of time window of 10 years, Table
2.5 shows panel regressions of time window of 20 years. Most of the previous papers do
not control time effect, which might overestimate the influence of capital account openness
on growth, hence both country effect and time effect are controlled in this paper.
Table 2.3. Panel regressions of time window of 5 years
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Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Time-window

CAPITAL(1955-2004, 55 years)

KAOPEN(1970-2014, 45 years)

Initial level of capital account openness

0.00012

0.00056

(0.00008)

(0.00953)

0.00015 **

0.01310 *

(0.00007)

(0.00807)

-0.02880 ***

-0.02719 **

(0.00644)

(0.01065)

1.91480 **

0.94630 ***

(0.75018)

(0.35032)

Number of Countries

94

155

Number of Periods

9

7

Number of Observations

783

1058

R-squared

0.123

0.067

F statistics/

23.783/

15.917/

P value

< 2.22e-16

1.3579e-12

Change of capital account openness

Log of initial GDP per capita

Average growth rate of Population

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The dummies of country and time are not reported

Table 2.3 shows panel analysis of time window of non-overlapping 5 years for
different measures of capital account openness of CAPITAL and KAOPEN. The sample
period of regression of CAPITAL is divided into 12 sub-periods 1955-1959, 1960-1964, …,
2000-2004, and the sample period of regression of KAOPEN is divided into 9 sub-periods
1970-1974, 1975-1979, …, 2010-2014. Then the average growth rate of GDP per capita
and the change of CAPITAL/KAOPEN are over these sub-periods, while the initial level
of CAPITAL/KAOPEN and the log of initial GDP per capita are values in the first year of
these sub-periods.
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Overall, the significance and magnitude of the coefficients of regressions of
CAPITAL and KAOPEN are very close to each other although they differ in sample
periods. The coefficients on Initial level of capital account openness of both CAPITAL and
KAOPEN are insignificant, but the coefficients on Change of capital account openness are
significant for both regressions. The average growth rate of GDP per capita over 5 years
would increase by 0.001% as the change of CAPITAL over five years increase by one, and
the average growth rate of GDP per capita over 5 years would increase by 1.38% as the
change of KAOPEN over five years increase by one.
The coefficients on log of initial GDP per capita for both regressions are
significantly negative, which means the richer a country is, the slower it grows relatively.
The coefficients on average growth rate of population for both regressions are significantly
positive, which implies the demographic dividend stands out in the short-run. These two
coefficients are stand to the literature.
Finally, we can safely conclude that the short-run effect of increasing capital
account openness on growth is significantly positive even though the initial level of capital
account openness has insignificant influence on growth yet still positive.
Table 2.4. Panel regressions of time window of 10 years
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Time-window

CAPITAL(1955-2004, 50 years)

KAOPEN(1975-2014, 40 years)

Initial level of capital account openness

0.00018 *

0.00688

(0.00011)

(0.00917)

0.00023 **

0.01557 **

Change of capital account openness
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(0.00009)

(0.00753)

-0.04385 ***

-0.05320 ***

(0.01066)

(0.00917)

1.29780 ***

1.07917 ***

(0.84676)

(0.41285)

Number of Countries

94

155

Number of Periods

5

4

Number of Observations

374

510

R-squared

0.254

0.262

F statistics/

23.118/

30.896/

P value

< 2.22e-16

< 2.22e-16

Log of initial GDP per capita

Average growth rate of Population

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The dummies of country and time are not reported

Table 2.4 shows panel analysis of time window of non-overlapping10 years for
different measures of capital account openness of CAPITAL and KAOPEN. The sample
period of regression of CAPITAL is divided into 5 sub-periods 1955-1964, 1965-1974, …,
1995-2004, and the sample period of regression of KAOPEN is divided into 4 sub-periods
1975-1984, 1984-1995, 1985-1994, 2005-2014.
The coefficient on initial level of CAPITAL is significantly positive, 0.00018 while
the coefficient on initial level of KAOPEN is positive yet statistically insignificant, 0.00688.
The same as the regressions for time window of 5 years, the coefficients on Change of
capital account openness of both CAPITAL and KAOPEN are statistically significant for
time window of 10 years. The average growth rate of GDP per capita over 10 years would
increase by 0.023% as the change of CAPITAL over five years increase by one. And the
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average growth rate of GDP per capita over 10 years would increase by 1.557% as the
change of KAOPEN over 10 years increase by one.
The coefficients on log of initial GDP per capita for both regressions are
significantly negative, which means the richer a country is, the slower it grows relatively.
The coefficients on average growth rate of population for both regressions are significantly
positive.
Table 2.5. Panel regressions of time window of 20 years
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Time-window

CAPITAL(1965-2004, 40 years)

KAOPEN(1975-2014, 40 years)

Initial level of capital account openness

0.00024 *

0.00980

(0.00013)

(0.01307)

0.00013 *

0.01516 *

(0.00007)

(0.00721)

-0.03309 ***

-0.06547 ***

(0.00564)

(0.00572)

0.12572

0.41092

(0.53435)

(0.39202)

Number of Countries

81

134

Number of Periods

2

2

Number of Observations

139

232

R-squared

0.537

0.112

F statistics/

15.372/

41.761/

P value

2.0838e-08

< 2.22e-16

Change of capital account openness

Log of initial GDP per capita

Average growth rate of Population

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The dummies of country and time are not reported
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Table 2.5 shows panel analysis of time window of 20 years for different measures
of capital account openness of CAPITAL and KAOPEN. The sample period of regression
of CAPITAL is divided into 2 sub-periods 1965-1984 and 1985-2004, and the sample
period of regression of KAOPEN is divided into 2 sub-periods 1975-1994, 1995-2014.
The coefficient on initial level of CAPITAL is significantly positive, 0.00024 while
the coefficient on initial level of KAOPEN is positive yet insignificant, 0.00980. The
coefficients on change of CAPITAL and KAOPEN keep significantly positive as that for
time window of 5 years and 10 years.
The average growth rate of GDP per capita over 20 years would increase by 0.013%
as the change of CAPITAL over five years increase by one. And the average growth rate
of GDP per capita over 20 years would increase by 1.516% as the change of KAOPEN
over 20 years increase by one.
The coefficients on log of initial GDP per capita for both regressions are
significantly negative, and the coefficients on average growth rate of population for both
regressions turn into insignificantly positive. And most of the regional dummies have
significant coefficients, which implies the characteristics of economic growth within each
region is very significant.

4.2.2. Cross-sectional regressions
In this sub-section, cross-sectional regressions are carried out to explore the long
run relationship between level of capital account openness, change in capital account and
growth.
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Table 2.6. Cross-sectional Regression: Growth and capital account openness
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita
(Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
CAPITAL

KAOPEN

1955-2004, 50 years

1970-2014, 45 years

-0.00015

-0.00946

(0.00009)

(0.00633)

-0.00015

-0.00124

(0.00010)

(0.00404)

-0.00127

-0.00087

(0.00140)

(0.00074)

0.55330 *

0.89439 ***

(0.31138)

(0.22653)

0.05913 ***

0.03899 ***

(0.01978)

(0.00975)

0.06791 ***

0.03914 ***

(0.02096)

(0.00906)

0.08731 ***

0.06297 ***

(0.02127)

(0.01065)

0.05635 **

0.04994 ***

(0.02440)

(0.00957)

0.04363 **

0.01814 *

(0.01857)

(0.01017)

0.05220 ***

0.03790 ***

(0.01790)

(0.00949)

Explanatory Variables

Initial level of capital account openness

Change of capital account openness

Log of initial GDP per capita

Average growth rate of Population

Region: Western Countries

Region: Southern Europe

Region: Central and Eastern Europe

Region: Newly Industrialized Countries

Region: Asia

Region: Sub-Saharan Africa

Region: Latin America
0.03476 ***
Region: Middle East
(0.01182)
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0.08049 ***

0.04468 ***

(0.01943)

(0.01027)

Number of countries

43

96

Adjusted R-squared

0.964

0.934

F statistics/

106.2/

113.6 /

P value

< 2.2e-16

< 2.2e-16

Region: North Africa

* p<0.01 ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Table 2.6 shows cross-sectional regressions for different measures of capital
account openness of CAPITAL and KAOPEN. The sample period of regression of
CAPITAL spans 50 years from 1955 to 2004, and the sample period of regression of
KAOPEN spans 45 years from 1970 to 2014.
Contrary to the short run panel analyses, the coefficients of cross-sectional
regressions on both initial level of CAPITAL and KAOPEN are negative though
insignificantly, so do the coefficients on Change of CAPITAL and KAOPEN.
The coefficients on log of initial GDP per capita for both regressions are
insignificantly negative, and the coefficients on average growth rate of population for both
regressions still keep significantly positive, 0.55330 for regression of CAPITAL and
0.89439 for regression of KAOPEN.

4.2.3. Estimation Summary
We can clearly see the panel analyses based on time windows of 5 years to 20 years
show that both level and change of capital account openness boost growth, especially for
the latter, while the cross-sectional regressions show that both of level and change of capital
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account openness do not have significant effect on growth in the long run (45 years to 50
years in this paper).
The results from panel analyses are consistent with most of the literature, while the
results from cross-sectional analyses are consistent Bussière and Fratzscher(2008), they
find that countries tend to gain in the short term, immediately following capital account
liberalization, but may not grow faster or even experience temporary growth reversals in
the medium to long term.

5. Conclusion Remarks
The field of capital account openness on growth is very controversial, and the
evidence is mixed at best. This paper explores the relationship between capital account
openness on growth using two measures of capital account openness, i.e., CAPITAL
(1955-2004) and Chinn-Ito Index (1970-2014).
My results show the evolutionary effects of capital account openness on growth
over time. Specifically, capital account liberalization tends to boost economy temporarily
in the short run, while shows no long-run growth-enhancing effect.
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CHAPTER THREE
INCOME INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
ABSTRACT

The relationship between income inequality and economic growth is complex itself,
the debate about it is still ongoing. Either the evidence of positive relationship or negative
relationship between them are reported in the literature.
Using data of Gini coefficient, GDP per capita, ratio of fixed capital to GDP and
ratio of labor to GDP from China for period 1978-2013, this paper attempts to explore long
run and short run causality relationship between income inequality and growth. My
findings show there exist neither long run nor short run causality link between Gini
coefficient and log of GDP per capita.
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1.

Introduction

The causal relationship between income inequality and economic growth is itself
complex. Ongoing efforts to understand this causal relationship in the literature have been
yielding mixed results. Theoretically, the causality between income inequality and
economic growth could run either way and through different mechanisms. Some studies
have either find positive relationships between them, while others find negative
relationships or no relationship at all. Consequently, a number of important policy-related
questions have emerged. These include whether inequality is harmful to economic growth,
whether growth is good for the poor, and whether highly unequal societies experience
slower economic growth than more egalitarian ones.
1) On the one hand, about the causality that income inequality affects economic
growth. Some scholars believe that income inequality show itself to be beneficial, to some
degree, in ensuring the efficiency of the economy, which enhances economic growth. Okun
(1975) argues that pursuing equality could reduce economic efficiency. As we all know,
high inequality provides incentives to work harder, invest and undertake risks to take
advantage of high rates of return (Mirrlees, 1971; Lazear and Rosen, 1981). For example,
if highly educated people are much more productive, then high differences in rates of return
may encourage more people to seek education. In addition, higher inequality fosters
aggregate savings, and therefore capital accumulation, if the rich have a lower propensity
to consume (Kaldor, 1956; Bourguignon, 1981).
As is well known, the Lewis model (Lewis, 1954) gives support to the argument that
increasing inequality is not only an inevitable consequence of economic growth but also a
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necessary condition for economic growth. The basic argument is that the savings are
essential to increase productivity and boot growth, and then the income distribution
towards top earners who tend to save and invest improve the economy growth. However,
Kuztnets (1955) also points out that in a less-developed-countries context there is no
guarantee that the higher income groups will save a significant proportion of their income
in their own country. According to Todaro (1994), unlike the historical experience of the
now developed countries, the rich in developing countries are characterized by spending in
luxury consumption usually imported and saving abroad.
While some researchers believe that greater inequality might harm growth. It is not
hard to think of Keynes’ theory that poor people have higher marginal propensity of
consumption, then income inequality will depress aggregate demand and economic growth,
and even permanent income theory of consumption. Moreover, in the presence of financial
bottleneck, different individuals to invest depends more on their income and wealth level,
then the poor individuals may not be able to afford worthwhile investments. For example,
lower-income households may choose to leave full-time education if they cannot afford the
fees, even though the rate of return (to both the individual and society) is high. In turn,
under-investment by the poor implies that aggregate output would be lower than the case
of perfect financial markets. We refer to this view, first formalized by Galor and Zeira
(1993, 1998), as the “human capital accumulation” theory.
Benabou (1996a), Benabou (2000), Durlauf (1996), and Mookherjee and Ray (2003)
provide additional theoretical contributions and Perotti (1996) and Easterly (2001) provide
evidence in support of this link between equality, human capital and growth.
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The most recent pro-equality evidence by OECD1 shows that when income inequality
rises, economic growth falls. One reason is that poorer members of society are less able to
invest in their education.
In addition to the introduced channels above that income inequality affects economic
growth, inequality can also generate greater market volatility and instability. One of the
channels is through its impact on the generation of finance-driven business cycles
(Galbraith, 2012). Some evidence of this has been seen in the much-debated relationship
between inequality and the onset of economic recession. Both the Great Depression of the
1930s and the 2007-2008 Great Recession were preceded by sharp increases in income,
wealth inequality and by a rapid rise in debt-to-income ratios among lower- and middleincome households (Kumhof and Rancière, 2010).
Kennickell (2009) shows us some evidence from SCF data, which confirms that rich
families hold riskier assets. In 2007 the top 10% of the income held 60.5% of the holdings
of checking, savings, money market and call accounts and 50.3% of the holdings of
certificates of deposits, but 90.4% of direct holdings of stocks and 87.9% of bonds, 51.9%
of mutual funds and hedge funds, and 38.1% of tax-deferred retirement accounts, such as
IRAs, Keoghs and 401(k) accounts. This obviously support the viewpoint that wealthier
households hold riskier assets. This fact tends to support the viewpoint that income
inequality being one of the factors in bringing bubbles and financial crises (see Lysandrou
(2011)).

1

http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/Focus-Inequality-and-Growth-2014.pdf
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2) On the other hand, the evidence about causality between growth and income
inequality is also inclusive. Kuznets (1955) hypothesized that income inequality worsens
in the early stages of economic growth and after reaching a peak, it declines at the later
stages of economic growth, this is the famous “Kuznets inverted-U curve” as Figure 3.1
shows.

Figure 3.1. Kuznets inverted-U curve
Kuznets explained that, excluding government intervention, there are two forces that
explain the income inequality before taxes: the concentration of savings in the upperincome groups and the industrial structure of the income distribution. The former yields
inequality in savings, which, all other the conditions being equal, has a cumulative effect
of increasing the proportion of income-yielding assets in the hands of the upper-income
groups leading to larger income shares of these groups and their descendants. The latter
force is the result of the process of industrialization and Urbanization, this is, economic
growth accompanied by the shift away from agricultural activities.
On one hand, the process increases the urban share in total population, which is
assumed more unequal than the rural population. On the other hand, since average per
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capita income of the rural population is usually found to be lower than that of the urban.
Kuznets (1955), argues that this gap in relative mean incomes tends to widen the as a result
of a more rapid growth of the per capita productivity in economic urban activities than in
agriculture.
Saith (1983) re-estimates the inverted U-curve using only the 41 LDC sub-sample,
excluding the "outliers" (the poorest and the richest countries). He shows that a better fit is
provided not by the inverted U-curve but rather by the an inverted-L the curve. Braking,
Ahluwalia, Carter, And Chenery (1979) use a 36 LDCs The sample of 16 countries which
are beyond the "turning point" estimated from cross-The country data and only Taiwan
shows some evidence of experiencing the second The phase of the inverted-U curve. These
findings suggest that, in the case of LDCs, the relationship between economic growth and
inequality could be better described by an inverted-L curve rather than an inverted U curve.
However, this discussion is focused only on the Relevance of the level of growth and/or
the rate of growth. Also, the when conjecturing about the inverted L-curve, heterogeneity
Among the LDCs is ignored.
Later, the Fields (1991), using a papers Produced for 20 countries as part of a research
project launched by the World Bank in 1985 and adding information of another 35
countries, confirms his previous finding (Fields, 1988) that there is not a definite
relationship between changes in inequality and the level or the rate of economic Growth,
but that those changes seem to be associated with the "the pattern of growth". Further
support to this view is given by Matyas, Konya and Macquarie (1998), who, using a two a
panel data set of 47 and 62 countries, find that it is not the per GDP Capita which explains
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income inequalities but rather the specific characteristics of a country such as social
structure, political system, and natural resources.
Lewis (1954), Kaldor (1957), and Pasinetti (1962) have predicted positive association
between growth and income inequality. While Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
Tabellini (1994), who find a significant and negative relationship between growth and
income inequality. While Hongyi Li and Hengfu Zou (1998) suggest inequality does not
harm growth.
Ugo (2002) uses a cross-state panel for the United States to study the relationship
between inequality and growth, and supports a negative relationship between inequality
and growth. Been-lon Chen(2003) propose an inverted-U relationship between initial
income distribution and long-term economic growth using cross-country data for 54
countries from 1970 to1992.
Guanghua Wan et al.(2006) analyze the growth–inequality relationship in post-reform
China, finding that this relationship is nonlinear and is negative irrespective of time
horizons.
Grigor(2007) uses with data from the transition economies of Central and Eastern
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, he finds inequality has significantly
negative on growth.
Christian(2008) suggests that under leftwing governments, inequality is negatively
associated with growth while the association is positive under rightwing governments.
Barro (2008) shows a negative effect of income inequality on economic growth, and this
effect diminishes as per capita GDP rises and may be positive for the richest countries.
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Dierk(2012) uses heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques to estimate the longrun effect of income inequality on per-capita income for 46 countries over the period 1970–
1995. And find that inequality has a negative long-run effect on income, both for the sample
as a whole and for important for different country groups: developed countries, developing
countries, democracies, and non-democracies.
Daniel et al(2014) find that higher inequality helps economic performance in the short
term but reduces the growth rate of GDP per capita farther in the future. The long-run effect
of higher inequality tends to be negative.
Using data of Gini coefficient, GDP per capita, ratio of fixed capital to GDP and ratio
of labor to GDP from China for period 1978-2013, this paper attempts to explore long run
and short run causality relationship between income inequality and growth. I conclude that
a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between these four variables, and Gini
coefficient exhibits a negative correlation with GDP in the long run.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 shows
the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.

2.

Data description

This paper uses Gini coefficient to measure income inequality, Log of GDP per capita;
and Growth rate of GDP per capita, i.e., Difference of Log of GDP per capita, Ratio of
Fixed capital to GDP and Ratio of labor income share to GDP. The data of Gini coefficient
of China for period 1978-2006 are cited from Jiandong Chen et al (2010), and that from
2007-2013 are collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), and Ratio of
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Fixed capital to GDP are supposed to affect economic growth, the former is collected from
NBSC and its time span is from 1978 to 2008 and the latter is cited from Haizheng Li et
al(2014) and its time span is from 1985 to 2010. For exploring how Lewis model works in
China, I collected the labor income share in national income, denoted as Labor_GDP.
Figure 3.2 shows Gini coefficient of China from 1978 to 2013, which increases from
0.3 to almost 0.5 in 2009, and then decreases gradually.
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Figure 3.2. Gini coefficient of China from 1978 to 2013
Figure 3.3 shows the scatter of GDP per capita and Gini coefficient, which is close to
Kuznets inverted U curve, and currently China is entering the right leg of curve.
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Figure 3.3. Kuznets inverted U curve in China
Figure 3.4 shows Log of GDP per capita of country from 1978 to 2013.
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Figure 3.4. Log of GDP per capita of China from 1978 to 2013
The ratio of fixed physical capital to GDP from 1978 to 2008 in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5. Ratio of fixed physical capital to GDP
Figure 3.6 shows the ratio of labor to GDP from 1978 to 2013.
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Figure 3.6. Ratio of labor to GDP
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Observations

GINI
0.379560
0.387250
0.487000
0.269300
0.068374
30

LN_GDPP
7.884651
7.881200
9.920197
5.945421
1.267802
30

CAPITAL_GDP
0.862883
0.848942
0.971346
0.697870
0.075884
30

LABOR_GDP
0.000346
0.000212
0.001128
2.87E-05
0.000340
30

2.1 Test for stationarity
We use our Augmented Dickey–Fuller test to test stationarity of the series of the
variables listed above, and the results are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Unit root test
Variable

Notation

P-value

P-value

Order

for original data

for its difference

of Integration

Log of GDP per capita

LN_GDPP

0.25

0.028

1

GINI coefficient

GINI

0.77

0.002

1

Ratio of fixed capital to GDP

CAPITAL_GDP

0.25

0.002

1

Ratio of labor to GDP

LABOR_GDP

0.15

0.027

1

As we can see in table 3.2, the P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis that the original
series has a unit root are shown in in the third column, and P-values for rejecting the null
hypothesis that the difference of original series has a unit root are shown in in the fourth
column. And the order of integration for the data are shown in the fifth column.

3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Traditional model
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Most of the empirical studies introduced in section 1 use panel data to study how
income inequality affects economic growth, and they usually estimate the following
equation:

ln yt − ln yt −1 = α ln yt −s + X t −1β + γIneqt −s + ε t

(1)

where i denotes a particular country and s denotes time interval. The variable ln y t
is the log of real GDP per capita so that the right-hand side of equation (1) approximates
s-year growth in a country. On the left hand-side, Ineqt − s denotes one measure of
inequality (typically, the Gini index); per capita GDP ( y t ) is the standard control for
convergence, and the vector X contains variable controlling for human and physical capital.
And some studies(say Edgar Begrakyan and Aleksandr Grigoryan, 2012) study how
economic growth affect income inequality, they tend to estimate the following equation:

Ineqt = α ln yt + X t −1β + ε t

(2)

where X denotes the control variable vector, like industry structure variables, poverty and
so on.
However, both types of researchers just ignored an important fact that the causality
relationship between income inequality and economic growth can be bi-directional. In this
case, VAR or VECM model would possibly be better.
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3.2. Co-integration and VEC Granger causality test
Two or more variables are said to be cointegrated, if they share common trend(s). As
Papana et al(2014) points out that the cointegration technique made a significant
contribution towards testing Granger causality. Although co-integration does not provide
any information about the direction of causality, if two variables are cointegrated, there
should be causality in at least one direction (Granger, 1988). To this respect, a cointegration
test can be viewed as an indirect test of long-run dependence (Engle and Granger, 1987).
Causality in non-stationary time series (in mean) is typically investigated through vector
error correction models (VECM) in econometrics, and it is subdivided into short-run and
long-run causality. To explore the relationship between the relevant variables including
GDP per capita and Gini coefficient, I conduct Johansen Cointegration test among I(1)
variables: LN_GDPP, GINI, CAPITAL_GDP, and LABOR_GDP.
Table 3.3. VAR Lag Order Selection
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: GINI LN_GDPP CAPITAL_GDP LABOR_GDP
Exogenous variables: C
Sample: 1978 2013
Included observations: 26
Lag

LogL

LR

FPE

AIC

SC

HQ

0
1
2
3
4

286.0914
441.1026
467.5998
493.4475
518.9297

NA
250.4027
34.65017*
25.84766
17.64153

4.43e-15
1.02e-19
5.05e-20
3.12e-20
2.82e-20*

-21.69934
-32.39251
-33.19999
-33.95750
-34.68690*

-21.50579
-31.42474
-31.45801*
-31.44130
-31.39649

-21.64361
-32.11383
-32.69836
-33.23293
-33.73938*

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion

114

The lag length of Johansen integration test model is the lag length of VAR model of
these four endogenous variables minus one. As table 2.3 shows, model of lag order 2 is
selected under two criteria LR and SC, model of lag order 4 are selected under three criteria,
i.e., FPE, AIC and HQ. Then I take the lag length of VAR model is chosen optimally as 4,
then model of lag 4 stands out as the most selected. Henceforth the optimal lag length of
Johansen cointegration test is 3 (the optimal lag of VAR model minus one).
Table 3.4. Johansen co-integration test
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2007
Included observations: 26 after adjustments
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: GINI LN_GDPP CAPITAL_GDP LABOR_GDP
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 3
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)

Eigenvalue

Trace
Statistic

0.05
Critical Value

Prob.**

None *
At most 1 *
At most 2
At most 3

0.851532
0.633355
0.419375
0.031945

90.65841
41.06638
14.97902
0.844125

47.85613
29.79707
15.49471
3.841466

0.0000
0.0017
0.0597
0.3582

Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)

Eigenvalue

Max-Eigen
Statistic

0.05
Critical Value

Prob.**

None *
At most 1 *
At most 2
At most 3

0.851532
0.633355
0.419375
0.031945

49.59203
26.08736
14.13489
0.844125

27.58434
21.13162
14.26460
3.841466

0.0000
0.0092
0.0524
0.3582

Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
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If the variables are cointegrated, a VECM should be estimated rather than a VAR
as in a standard Granger causality test (Granger, 1988). Since VAR models suggest a short
run relationship between the variables because long run information is removed in the first
differencing, while a VECM can avoid this issue. In addition, the VECM can distinguish
between a long run and a short run relationship among the variables and can identify
causality in Granger’s sense. VECM shows two underlying causalities: error correction
term, shows long-run causality; and lagged variables, show short-run causality, and the
model for LN_GDPP, GINI, LABOR_GDP, and CAPITAL_GDP are shown in equations
(3)-(6):
]

∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3 = 𝛼' +

_

𝛽'$ ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^$ +
$&'

a

𝛾'$ ∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^$ +
$&'

c

+

𝛼'$ ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$

(3)

$&'

𝛿'$ ∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$ + 𝜉' 𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' + 𝑢'3
$&'
]

∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3 = 𝛼7 +

_

𝛽7$ ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^$ +
$&'
c

a

𝛾7$ ∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^$ +
$&'

+

𝛼7$ ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$

(4)

$&'

𝛿7$ ∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$ + 𝜉7 𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' + 𝑢73
$&'
]

∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3 = 𝛼N +

_

𝛽N$ ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^$ +
$&'

c

+

a

𝛾N$ ∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^$ +
$&'

𝛼N$ ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$

(5)

$&'

𝛿N$ ∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$ + 𝜉N 𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' + 𝑢N3
$&'
]

∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3 = 𝛼V +
c

_

𝛽V$ ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^$ +
$&'

+

a

𝛾V$ ∆𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^$ +
$&'

𝛼V$ ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$

(6)

$&'

𝛿V$ ∆𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^$ + 𝜉V 𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' + 𝑢V3
$&'

where ∆ is the difference operator, 𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' 	
  refers to the error correction term derived from
the long run-cointegrating relationship via the Johanssen maximum likelihood procedure,
i.e.,
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𝐸𝐶𝑇3^' = 𝛽' 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼3^' + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃3^' + 𝛽N 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿3^' + 𝛽V 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃3^'

(7)

and 𝑢$,3 ′𝑠 (for 𝑖 = 1,2,3,4) are serially uncorrelated random error terms with mean zero.
Equation (3) will be used to test causation from GDP, ratio of fixed capital to GDP, and
ratio of labor to GDP to Gini coefficient, and equation (4) will be used to test causality
from Gini coefficient, ratio of fixed capital to GDP, and ratio of labor to GDP to GDP and
so on.
Table 3.5. VECM
Vector Error Correction Estimates
Sample (adjusted): 1981 2007
Included observations: 27 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( )
Cointegrating Eq:

CointEq1

CointEq2

GINI(-1)

1.000000

0.000000

LN_GDPP(-1)

0.000000

1.000000

CAPITAL_GDP(-1)

-0.605061
(0.17853)

-10.25745
(2.23578)

LABOR_GDP(-1)

-1232.146
(161.148)

-11799.58
(2018.12)

C

0.516918

4.507590

Error Correction:

D(GINI)

D(LN_GDPP)

D(CAPITAL_GDP) D(LABOR_GDP)

CointEq1

-0.499287
(0.16985)

0.052549
(0.76558)

-1.663808
(0.60659)

0.000533
(0.00024)

CointEq2

0.053301
(0.01494)

-0.010794
(0.06732)

0.134200
(0.05334)

-4.13E-05
(2.1E-05)

D(GINI(-1))

-0.059356
(0.29308)

-0.105297
(1.32107)

2.777943
(1.04671)

-0.000291
(0.00042)

D(GINI(-2))

0.321095
(0.24893)

0.731783
(1.12206)

0.965776
(0.88903)

-0.000566
(0.00035)

D(LN_GDPP(-1))

0.085170
(0.08489)

1.246492
(0.38264)

0.149808
(0.30317)

-0.000286
(0.00012)

D(LN_GDPP(-2))

-0.331663
(0.12128)

-0.417720
(0.54667)

0.605633
(0.43314)

8.65E-05
(0.00017)
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D(CAPITAL_GDP(-1))

0.191770
(0.08492)

0.283430
(0.38276)

-0.116715
(0.30327)

-9.01E-05
(0.00012)

D(CAPITAL_GDP(-2))

0.085645
(0.05999)

0.251140
(0.27042)

-0.081063
(0.21426)

-0.000219
(8.5E-05)

D(LABOR_GDP(-1))

-493.8889
(232.541)

397.3477
(1048.18)

1812.968
(830.497)

0.023835
(0.33005)

D(LABOR_GDP(-2))

-186.1018
(291.499)

343.3875
(1313.93)

1360.590
(1041.06)

-0.314569
(0.41373)

C

0.010381
(0.00573)

0.047407
(0.02583)

3.71E-05
(0.02047)

-1.05E-05
(8.1E-06)

R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Sum sq. resids
S.E. equation
F-statistic
Log likelihood
Akaike AIC
Schwarz SC
Mean dependent
S.D. dependent

0.736449
0.571730
0.001663
0.010195
4.470941
92.57076
-6.042278
-5.514345
0.006170
0.015579

0.686828
0.491096
0.033788
0.045954
3.509020
51.91575
-3.030797
-2.502863
0.140012
0.064417

0.509481
0.202907
0.021211
0.036410
1.661854
58.20088
-3.496362
-2.968428
0.004557
0.040782

0.875855
0.798264
3.35E-09
1.45E-05
11.28815
269.6252
-19.15742
-18.62949
-3.35E-05
3.22E-05

Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)
Determinant resid covariance
Log likelihood
Akaike information criterion
Schwarz criterion

7.34E-21
9.05E-22
500.8905
-33.25115
-30.75546

Table 3.5 can be divided into two parts, the first part is the co-integration equations
part, while the second part is the error correction equation part. The two co-integration
equations are
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 = −0.517 + 0.605 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 1232.146 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃

(8)

	
  𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃 = 	
   −4.508 + 	
  10.257 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 11799.580 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃

(9)

As the (8) and (9) show, there exists long run equilibrium relationship between Gini
coefficient, Ratio of fixed physical capital and Ratio of labor to GDP, and there also exists
long run equilibrium relationship between log of GDP per capita, ratio of fixed capital to

118

GDP and ratio of labor to GDP. Then we can see there exist no long run equilibrium
relationship between Gini coefficient and log of GDP per capita.
For test the temporal causality, I conduct Granger causality/Block Exogeneity Wald
tests based upon VEC model shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6. Granger causality/Block Exogeneity Wald tests
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1978 2013
Included observations: 28
Dependent variable: GINI
Excluded

Chi-sq

df Prob.

LN_GDPP
CAPITAL_GDP
LABOR_GDP

0.950908
0.479882
1.698443

2
2
2

0.6216
0.7867
0.4277

All

9.701780

6

0.1378

Dependent variable: LN_GDPP
Excluded

Chi-sq

df Prob.

GINI
CAPITAL_GDP
LABOR_GDP

0.881276
7.085170
5.022048

2
2
2

0.6436
0.0289
0.0812

All

7.961938

6

0.2409

Dependent variable: CAPITAL_GDP
Excluded

Chi-sq

df Prob.

GINI
LN_GDPP
LABOR_GDP

6.982444
13.18490
11.26572

2
2
2

0.0305
0.0014
0.0036

All

23.14216

6

0.0008

Dependent variable: LABOR_GDP
Excluded

Chi-sq
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df Prob.

GINI
LN_GDPP
CAPITAL_GDP

1.709970
10.87571
11.44861

2
2
2

0.4253
0.0043
0.0033

All

19.58939

6

0.0033

The results shown in Table 3.6 about the temporal causality links among the four variables
are summarized in Figure 1.7. We can also see no temporal causality link between Gini
coefficient and log of GDP per capita. Bi-lateral temporal causality links exist between log
of GDP per caita and ratio of fixed capital to GDP, ratio of fixed capital to GDP and ratio
of labor to GDP. Unidirectional causality links run from Gini coefficient to ratio of fixed
capital to GDP, and from log of GDP per capita to ratio of labor to GDP.

Figure 3.7. Temporal Causality Links

4.

Conclusion Remarks

In this study, causality link is investigated between Gini coefficient, GDP per capita,
ratio of fixed capital to GDP and ratio of labor to GDP in China from 1978 to 2013.
Evidence from the study shows there exist neither long run nor short run causality link
between Gini coefficient and log of GDP per capita.
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